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CITIZENS ABROAD AND SOCIAL COHESION AT
HOME: REFOCUSING A CROSS-BORDER TAX
POLICY DEBATE
Michael S. Kirsch*
Modern developments raise significant questions about the future
importance (or non-importance) of formal citizenship status. For example,
while many have interpretedthe European Union project, with its emphasis
on the free movement of individuals, as portending the decreasing
relevance of nationality, recent developments, such as the "Brexit" vote,
suggest that national identity remains an important factor for many
individuals. While much of the public debate over citizenship focuses on
areas, such as immigration, that are more obviously tied to formal
citizenship status, this debate also impacts cross-bordertax policy.
Over the past decade, several scholars have addressed the use of
citizenship status as a jurisdictional basis upon which to tax the foreignsource income of individuals who live outside of their country of
citizenship. Some writers have defended the United States' use of this
citizenship-based taxation ("CBT") to tax the foreign income of citizens
living abroad,while a more significant number of scholars have rejected it
and proposed that the United States tax the foreign income of U.S. citizens
only if they reside in the United States (residence-based taxation, or
"RBT").
This article considers the competing normative arguments surrounding
the use of citizenship as a jurisdictional basis to tax, and distills the
strengths and weaknesses of each. In so doing, it highlights the most
salientfactors upon which the debate hinges, and illustrates the importance
of difficult-to-measure predictions of how both individuals and society will
react to different regimes.
The article ultimately concludes that the debate between CBT and RBT
often overemphasizes the subjective circumstances of particular
individuals, and underemphasizes the broader impact of the alternative
regimes on social cohesion within the United States. When coupled with
the significant residence neutrality concerns that may arise under an RBT
regime and the resulting potential to create a permanent class of wealthy
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U.S. citizens living abroad who would not be subject to taxation, these
social cohesion concerns suggest that the United States should continue to
exercise citizenship-based taxing jurisdiction. However, the article
acknowledges that such a CBT regime can only be defended in practice if
the InternalRevenue Service (Service) and Congress are willing to address
the significantpracticalcompliance concernsfaced by many citizens living
abroad.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Developments over the past few decades raise important questions
regarding the future importance (or lack thereof) of an individual's
citizenship status. For example, the European Union, with its emphasis on
freedom of movement, might be viewed as de-emphasizing the importance
of nation-state citizenship in favor of a supranational identity. However,
more recent developments, such as the "Brexit" vote, suggest that
predictions of the demise of national citizenship's importance may be
exaggerated, and that national identity remains an important factor for
many individuals and countries.'
While much of the scholarly and political discussion has focused on
areas, such as immigration law, that are more obviously tied to citizenship
status, the role of citizenship has also become the focus of international tax
policy debate. This debate focuses on the use of citizenship status as a
jurisdictional basis upon which to tax income that arises outside of an
individual's country of citizenship. Some scholars, including myself, 2 have
defended the United States' use of citizenship to tax the foreign income of
citizens living abroad (so-called citizenship-based taxation, or "CBT").
Increasingly, however, other scholars have downplayed the importance of
citizenship status, suggesting that it should play no role (or only a minimal
role) in determining whether an individual should be subject to tax on
income that arises outside of the country of citizenship. Instead, they
suggest a country should tax its citizen's foreign-source income only if the
citizen actually resides in the country (so-called residence-based taxation,
or "RBT").3

* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. A.B., Cornell University, 1985; J.D., Harvard
Law School, 1988; LL.M., New York University School of Law, 1989. I would like to
thank participants in the University of Michigan Law School and McGill University Faculty
of Law conference on Taxation and Citizenship, and participants in the 2015 Tax Citizenship
and Income Shifting Symposium in London, England, for their helpful comments on earlier
presentations of these ideas.
1 Cf. Mark Twain, Mark Twain Amused, N.Y.J., June 2, 1897, at I ("The report of my
death was an exaggeration").
2 See Michael S. Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad:
Reconciling Principle and Practice, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 117 (2014) [hereinafter Kirsch,
Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad]; Michael S. Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a
Global Economy, 82 N.Y.U.L. REV. 443 (2007) [hereinafter Kirsch, Taxing Citizens].
3 Both groups of scholars agree that a country has the right to tax income that arises
within its borders, regardless of the taxpayer's residence or citizenship status. See infra Part
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This article considers the competing normative arguments raised in this
context and attempts to distill the strengths and weaknesses of each, as
applied to both CBT and RBT. In doing so, it highlights the most salient
factors upon which the debate hinges, and illustrates the importance of
difficult-to-measure predictions of how both individuals and society will
react to different regimes. In particular, it suggests -that much of the earlier
debate is misdirected - rather than focusing only (or primarily) on the
subjective impact of the rules on the individual citizen-taxpayer, it is
important to consider the impact of these rules on the broader community.
When the potential impact on social cohesion is considered, particularly to
the extent that formal citizenship status still has meaning to a significant
percentage of those who hold it, the case for CBT is significantly
strengthened. The article also briefly considers (but ultimately dismisses)
the possibility of a middle ground between the current CBT regime and an
RBT regime for taxing the foreign source income of U.S. citizens.
Part I provides a brief summary of the principal justifications for and
criticisms of CBT, and a summary of proposed RBT-based replacements.
Part II then distills the principal normative arguments underlying the CBT
versus RBT debate. Of particular note, this analysis identifies an often
underappreciated aspect of the debate: arguments in favor of a shift to RBT
tend to focus on the subjective adverse impact of CBT on particular classes
of citizens living overseas, while arguments in favor of retaining CBT are
grounded in concerns about the impact of RBT on the social cohesion of the
broader United States community. Part III then compares the relative
magnitude and importance of the competing normative claims. It concludes
that the social cohesion concerns, particularly when coupled with the
incentives an RBT regime might create for the creation of a permanent class
of wealthy and untaxed U.S. citizens living abroad, suggest that the United
States should continue to exercise citizenship-based taxing jurisdiction. In
doing so, however, the Service and Congress must be willing to
acknowledge that many overseas citizens face significant practical
compliance-related concerns, and must be willing to implement appropriate
statutory and administrative relief to address these practical aspects of the
CBT regime.

II. THE LANDSCAPE

OF THE DEBATE

The United States, unlike other countries, 4 uses citizenship as a
4 See Kirsch, Taxing Citizens, supra note 2, at 445 n.5.
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jurisdictional basis upon which to tax individuals. As a result, a United
States citizen is subject to U.S. income taxation regardless of whether the
individual resides in the United States or abroad, and regardless of where
the income arises. 5 This broad jurisdictional exercise is sometimes referred
to as "citizenship-based taxation" ("CBT") of worldwide income. In
addition to exercising CBT over non-resident citizens, the United States
taxes the worldwide income of individuals who reside in the United States,
6
regardless of their citizenship status. Many other countries also exercise
this type of "residence-based taxation" ("RBT") over the worldwide income
of their residents. In addition to the exercise of CBT and/or RBT, both of
which focus on the status of the individual earning the income, most
countries also exercise some form of source-based taxation - i.e., the
taxation of income that arises within a country's territory, regardless of the
status of the taxpayer earning the income. 7 Accordingly, the principal
difference between CBT and RBT concerns the taxation of foreign source
income earned by a citizen living abroad - under a CBT regime the
country of citizenship generally taxes that foreign source income of a
nonresident citizen, while under an RBT regime the country of citizenship
does not tax it. 8
This brief summary of the United States' use, and other countries'
nonuse, of CBT is both overbroad and underbroad. It is overbroad because
the United States' exercise of CBT has some significant exceptions. A U.S.
citizen who works abroad and meets certain statutory exceptions is allowed
to exclude from gross income approximately $100,000 of foreign earned
income, plus an additional amount for housing expenses each year. 9 Also,
to the extent a U.S. citizen pays foreign income tax on income that arises
abroad, the United States allows the individual to claim a foreign tax credit
for the foreign taxes paid.' 0 Accordingly, it is possible that a U.S. citizen
living abroad might owe no U.S. income tax (or only a residual amount)
after applying the foreign earned income exclusion and/or the foreign tax
credit.

5 Treas. Reg. §1.1-I(b) (2008). Citizenship is also used as a jurisdictional basis to
impose the U.S. federal estate and gift tax. See Treas. Reg. §,20.0-1(b) (1994).
6 Treas. Reg. § 1.1 -1 (b) (2008).
7 Kirsch, Taxing Citizens, supra note 2, at 448-49.
8 Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad, supra note 2, at 121-22;
see also Ruth Mason, Citizenship Taxation, 89 SO. CAL. L. REV. 169, 180-81 (2016); Daniel
Shaviro, Taxing Potential Community Members' Foreign Source Income 1-2 (N.Y.U, Law
& Economics Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 15-09, 2015), https:// papers.ssm.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2625732.
9 I.R.C. § 911. See Rev. Proc. 2015-53, 2015-44 I.R.B. 10. for inflation adjustments.
'0 I.R.C. § 901.
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The summary is underbroad because, despite foreign countries' general
nonreliance on CBT, many foreign countries nonetheless tax their citizens
living abroad in certain circumstances. This extended jurisdiction occurs in
the context of the foreign country's RBT regime, which might, for example,
make the definition of tax resident "sticky," continuing to treat a citizen
who moves abroad as a tax resident for a specified number of years."
Because of the significant exceptions that apply to the taxation of U.S.
citizens, and the extended reach of some other countries' residence-based
regimes, Daniel Shaviro has observed that
the United States could reasonably be viewed as not in substance a
dramatic outlier. Indeed, even if our overall reach as to [potential
community members] is unusually broad, keeping in mind both
who is taxable on [foreign source income] and how much U.S. tax
they owe (or what compliance burdens they occur), the gap may
be narrowing as other countries, concerned about tax-motivated
temporary or permanent expatriation, move in our general
direction .2

Despite these caveats, the extent of the United States' formal reliance
on citizenship as a jurisdictional basis is admittedly unique. Given that the
United States' approach differs significantly from the commonly utilized
methods for taxing individuals in a global setting, it is important to consider
whether the United States' position remains justifiable, particularly in an
ever more global world. The following subparts summarize the main
arguments supporting the United States' general approach (many of which I
have explained in greater detail elsewhere), 3 along with the main
4
arguments against the United States' approach.'
A. The Brief Casefor Citizenship-BasedTaxation
The most long-standing justification for CBT concerns the benefits that
citizenship confers on an individual. 15 As the Supreme Court observed in
1 See Edward A. Zelinsky, Citizenship and Worldwide Taxation: Citizenship as an
Administrable Proxy for Domicile, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1289, 1301 (2011); see also Shaviro,
supra note 8, at 6-13 (providing examples of other countries that tax the foreign-source

income of individuals who do not have current-year physical presence).
12 Shaviro, supra note 8, at 17.
13 See generally Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad,supra note 2.

14 Id. at 123-40 (summarizing the spectrum of views).
15 This justification was invoked in legislative history when citizenship-based taxation
was first implemented under the Civil War-era income tax and when it was reintroduced in
the 1894 income tax. See Kirsch, Taxing Citizen, supra note 2, 449-453.
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Cook v. Tait, the 1924 case upholding a constitutional challenge to CBT,
"the government, by its very nature, benefits the citizen and his property
wherever found, and therefore has the power to make the benefit
complete."' 6 The benefits available to U.S. citizens include the right to
enter the United States at any time, the right to vote, and the potential
availability of personal and property protection overseas.' 7 While this
benefits argument has intuitive appeal, both I and others have observed its
shortcomings as a principal justification for CBT. 18 Even in a wholly
domestic context, the benefits rationale is no longer viewed as a sufficient
justification for imposing a progressive income tax. After all, under a
progressive income tax there is not necessarily a correlation between the
taxes paid and the benefits received. In an international context, any such
correlation may be even more tenuous. For example, an individual living
abroad does not have the current enjoyment of many tangible benefits
generated by federal tax expenditures, such as federal highways and
federally funded schools (although she might someday return to the United
States and receive the benefit of the United States having maintained those
programs and infrastructure during her absence). A more extreme example
involves an individual born abroad who acquires U.S. citizenship at birth by
reason of the U.S. citizenship of one or both of her parents. Such an
individual might never have entered the United States and might have no
plans to do so, and her enjoyment of any direct benefits of federal
expenditures would accordingly be very limited. In such a situation, the
only valuable benefit of citizenship might be the ability to enter and reside
in the United States in the future if her plans unexpectedly change.
Perhaps the most that can be said of the benefits argument is that there
is at least some objective value to holding U.S. citizenship. After all, many
non-citizens presumably would pay a significant amount of money (if they
had the financial capacity to do so) in order to obtain U.S. citizenship.
However, the subjective value of citizenship to a particular taxpayer is
much more varied and depends on a number of factors - e.g., whether and
how frequently the individual intends to enter the United States and

16 Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 56 (1924).

17 For a more detailed discussion of these and other benefits, including their practical
and theoretical limits, see Kirsch, Taxing Citizens, supra note 2, at 471-76 (concluding that,
despite some limitations, these benefits retain value even in a modern world); see also
Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad, supra note 2, at 124.
18 See, e.g., Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad, supra note 2, at
124-25. Shaviro notes that "perhaps benefits serves an entirely different function here than
it does in domestic tax policy debate. Rather than relating to the libertarian quest for
despised redistribution, it serves as an intuitive proxy for being entirely among 'us."'
Shaviro, supra note 8, at [Draft 29].
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whether she intends to permanently reside or work here; the status of the
individual as a citizen of another country in addition to the United States;
and the economic and social circumstances in the foreign country in which
she might otherwise reside, among other factors.
Thus, while the benefits rationale has some salience to the CBT
discussion (indeed, it might explain why at least some overseas citizens
continue to retain their US citizenship - and its attendant tax burden despite their lack of present plans to return), it cannot be the sole (or even
primary) justification for CBT. Standing alone, the benefits rational might
justify some type of minimum level of annual charge, but not necessarily
the current progressive marginal income tax system utilized by the United
States.
The modern progressive marginal income tax is often justified under
ability-to-pay principles, rather than the benefits rationale. Under abilityto-pay principles, the cost of supporting a community is distributed among
the community's members based on their ability to pay. While ability-topay arguments typically focus on distributional aspects - e.g., the
steepness of progressive marginal tax rates - they also raise a threshold
question that is particularly relevant to the CBT issue: "whose ability to
pay" is relevant. 9 In particular, are U.S. citizens living abroad sufficiently
connected to the United States such that we should expect them to share in
its financial support?
Given the wide range of individual circumstances, the degree of
subjective U.S.-connectedness varies significantly among nonresident U.S.
citizens. 20 Many nonresident citizens, particularly those who were born and
raised in the United States and may consider permanently returning to the
United States at some future date, retain a strong connection to the country.
Others, who may have been born in the United States but who have lived
the majority of their life abroad and have no intention of returning to the
United States, might have less of a subjective connection to the country
(particularly if they were born to non-citizen parents who were temporarily
in the United States - e.g., as students - and they left the United States
while still children). Similarly, a citizen who was born abroad and obtained
citizenship by reason her parents' U.S. citizenship, but who has lived her
entire life outside the United States and has no intention of moving to the
United States, might have a limited subjective connection to the United
States. At the extreme, it is possible that a citizen in one of these latter

19 Kirsch, Taxing Citizens, supra note 2, at 480.

20 For a more detailed explanation of this issue, see id.at 479-88. See also Kirsch,
Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad, supra note 2, at 125-27.
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2
groupings might not even be aware of her U.S. citizenship status. 1
Despite this range of subjective circumstances, it is possible to make
general observations that apply to a significant portion of citizens abroad.
Indeed, organizations representing the interests of U.S. citizens abroad
frequently do so, particularly in the context of congressional hearings for
22
For example, a
legislation that would benefit overseas citizens.
representative of one such organization, after noting that she had been born
and raised in the United States but had moved to France for business
reasons nineteen years earlier, observed:

Most Americans living overseas are just as "home grown" as I am,
and many have family situations similar to mine. We have
accepted or chosen to live overseas to represent our businesses or
to follow our dreams, but we are also conscious of the fact that we
are unofficial representatives of the United States in everything we
do and say while there. We keep our links to the United States as
strong as possible, visiting "home" as often as possible, educating
our children in U.S. schools if we can afford it and if they are
available where we live. We go to great lengths to make sure that
our children have U.S. citizenship and valid passports. We
struggle to ensure that our U.S. tax obligations are met. We vote
23
in U.S. elections despite the difficulties with absentee balloting.
After noting that overseas citizens advocacy groups had convinced the
State Department to reverse its longstanding policy that presumed that a
U.S. citizen who acquired foreign nationality intended to relinquish her
U.S. citizenship, she observed that this "wonderful" policy change not only
would eliminate "heart-wrenching cases where U.S. citizenship could have
been unintentionally lost, but symbolically it goes much further, for it
indicates that at least one part of the Washington establishment recognizes
that our presence overseas in no way diminishes our deep emotional

21 These particular subgroups are discussed in more detail infra notes 86-104 and
accompanying text.
22 Kirsch, Taxing Citizens, supra note 2, at 481-82.
23 U.S. Citizens Overseas: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On International Operations
of the H. Comm. On Foreign Affairs, 102nd Cong. 38 (1991) (statement of Stephanie H.
Simonard, Chair, World Federation of American Abroad). Ms. Simonard was testifying on
behalf of the World Federation of Americans Abroad, an umbrella organization whose
membership included a number of other advocacy groups for U.S. citizens abroad, and
which she described as representing "by far the largest group of non-U.S. government

individuals and businesses that exists overseas reaching all parts of the earth where
Americans congregate." Id. at 37.
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24

attachment to our country."

Similar appeals to the communal ties between the United States and its
citizens abroad have been made by overseas citizen advocacy groups
seeking the inclusion of overseas citizens in the official U.S. census count.
For example, the executive director of one such advocacy group asserted
that census inclusion "will respond to the patriotic desire of the American
community around the world to be counted, to be measured, to be seen in
25
its proper proportions as a dynamic part of our society."
Granted, these and similar statements might merely reflect self-serving
declarations by citizens advocacy groups in the context of lobbying for
desired legislation. 26 Even so, over the past few decades these appeals to
communal ties have been effective in securing overseas citizens a number
of favorable results for which their advocacy groups have lobbied strongly,
including more effective ability to vote for President, Vice President, and
members of Congress; 27 ensuring that U.S. citizens acquiring foreign
nationality were not presumed to have relinquished their U.S. citizenship; 28
and protecting the ability of U.S. citizens living abroad to transmit
citizenship to their children born abroad.
Given the importance of these communal ties-based arguments in
securing requested legislation and administrative policies, it is not
unreasonable to invoke the same arguments in determining whether citizens
abroad are members of the broader United States community for purposes
of supporting that community. Indeed, Congress apparently has adopted
this broad view of the community in the case of the traditional non-financial
obligation of citizenship - the obligation to defend the country if called
upon. While the United currently does not have a military draft, all male
citizens - including those residing outside the United States - are
required to register with the Selective Service upon reaching age 18.29

24 Id. at 39 (statement of Stephanie H. Simonard) (emphasis added).
25 Americans Abroad, How Can We Count Them?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On
the Census of the H. Comm. On Government Reform, 107th Cong. 46 (2001) (statement of
Thomas W. Fina, Executive Director, Democrats Abroad) (emphasis added).
26 Kirsch, Taxing Citizens, supra note 2, at 482.
27 Id., at 474-75 (discussing the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting
Act, and critiquing efforts by overseas citizens advocacy groups to secure a single member
of Congress, or nonvoting delegate, who would represent the interests of overseas citizens).
28 See supra note 25 and accompanying text (describing change in State Department
policy).
29 50 U.S.C. § 3802 (2016) (requiring registration by "every male citizen of the United

States, and every other male person residing in the United States"). By distinguishing
"every male citizen" from "every other male person residing in the United States," this
language implies that the obligation rests on male citizens whether resident or not.
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Admittedly, many U.S. citizens living abroad do not fit the traditional
portrait of an overseas citizen invoked by advocacy groups in the lobbying
activities described above. Nonetheless, even a U.S. citizen whose personal
ties to the United States are not as strong as those described above may still
have significant ties to the country. Indeed, the fact that a U.S. citizen (at
least one who is aware of her citizenship status) retains that citizenship
implies some level of voluntary self-identification with the United States.30
Admittedly, for some U.S. citizens living overseas this connection might be
so tenuous as to bring into question their membership in the community that
has an obligation to financially support the United States under ability-topay principles.

As discussed infta,31 specific exceptions might be

appropriate for these limited groups without undermining the applicability
of ability-to-pay principles to those overseas citizens whose circumstances
are closer to the traditional portrait frequently invoked by advocacy groups
in non-tax settings (e.g., when seeking more favorable legislation).
B. The Brief Case Against Citizenship-BasedTaxation
Other scholars have argued that the problems - both theoretical and
practical - associated with CBT justify the repeal of CBT in the United
States. 32 In its place, they generally advocate various forms of residencebased taxation. In order to set the stage for a discussion of the competing
normative values at stake, this subpart summarizes some of the principal
concerns raised by other scholars, as well as their proposed alternatives to
33
CBT.
Some scholars have conceded that CBT has theoretical merit, 34 but that
interpretation is confirmed by the Selective Service System's website. See SELECTIVE
SERVICE Sys., https://www.sss.gov/regver/wfregistration.aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 2016)

(providing separate registration links for citizens living inside the United States and citizens
living outside the United States); see also Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens
Abroad, supra note 2, at 197 n.360 and accompanying text.
30 See Kirsch, Taxing Citizens, supra note 2, at 481.
31 See infra notes 86-104 and accompanying text.
32

Cf. Zelinsky, supra note II (supporting CBT, but as a proxy for domicile, rather

than on its own merits). But see Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad,
supra note 2, at 128 (suggesting that Zelinky's argument is, in part, based on a benefits

rationale for CBT).
33 This summary does not purport to be a complete compilation of all the articles

written in this area. Rather, it attempts to highlight each of the principle arguments of which
the author is aware. For a more detailed analysis of the arguments against CBT, see Kirsch,
Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad, supra note 2, at 128-40, 181-210.
34 Cynthia Blum and Paula Singer's acknowledgement of the theoretical merit of CBT
is based on a combination of principles, including the benefits rationale, fairness, and the
potential incentives to reside abroad created by an RBT regime. See Cynthia Blum & Paula
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the United States should, nonetheless, eliminate CBT on practical,
administrative grounds. For example, Cynthia Blum and Paula Singer,
writing in 2008, concluded that "[o]ur disagreement with Professor Kirsch
about the wisdom of citizenship-based taxation centers on issues of
compliance and administrability. '
They highlighted both the compliance
problems faced by taxpayers, and the enforcement difficulties faced by the
Service in an international context. These administrative issues have
become more prominent in the past few years with the enactment and
implementation of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act ("FATCA").36
The FATCA regime, by bringing foreign financial institutions within the
scope of the U.S. information reporting system, has the potential to increase
the Service's ability to enforce the CBT regime, but at the same time it has
created additional compliance-related problems for U.S. citizens overseas.
Simultaneously, the Service's increased enforcement efforts with respect to
the Foreign Bank Account Report ("FBAR") and other required forms has
increased the compliance burdens on overseas citizens.37
Other scholars, while noting the administrability problems with CBT, 38
also object to CBT on more substantive grounds. For example, Reuven AviYonah rejects benefits-based arguments, asserting that the right to enter the
United States "seems a weak basis for such a heavy price as worldwide
taxation., 39 In addition, he reasons that the United States' CBT regime
cannot be based on ability-to-pay concerns, given that many overseas
citizens end up paying little or no U.S. income tax because of the foreign
earned income exclusion and the foreign tax credit.40 Accordingly, he
concludes that "[w]e should not base a broad rule such as ability-to-pay
taxation of nonresident citizens on the relatively few cases of citizens living
overseas in countries that have no or low income taxes. 41
Bernard Schneider also rejects benefits-based justifications, focusing

Singer, A Coherent Policy Proposalfor U.S. Residence-Based Taxation of Individuals, 41
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 705,716 (2008).

" Id. at 710-11 (footnotes omitted).
36 FATCA was enacted by the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L.
No.111-147 §501, 124 Stat. 71,97-106 (codified inI.R.C. §§ 1471-1474 (2010)).
37 For a detailed analysis of the impact of FATCA and FBAR enforcement on overseas
citizens, see Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad, supra note 2, at 140-

81.
38 Reuven Avi-Yonah notes that "administrability is perhaps the strongest argument
for not taxing nonresident citizens." Reuven Avi-Yonah, The Case Against Taxing Citizens,
58 TAX NOTES INT'L 389, 394 (May 3, 2010).
3

Id. at 392.

SId.at 393.
41 id.

2017]

Social Cohesion and Tax

particularly on overseas citizens who have little connection to the United
States, such as those born in the United States to non-citizen parents who
were only temporarily present in the United States, and those born abroad
to U.S.-citizen parents but who have never lived here, held a U.S. passport,
or otherwise received any direct benefit from U.S. citizenship and, in
extreme cases, might not even be aware of their U.S. citizen status. He
observes that "[a]lthough it is fair to say that U.S. citizenship is likely to
have some value for most U.S. expatriates, this value is impossible to
quantify. An unquantifiable, even inchoate right is a very weak peg on
which to hang the heavy hat of worldwide taxation .... ,,42
Similarly, in rejecting ability-to-pay arguments, Schneider focuses on
citizens with a tenuous connection to the United States, acknowledging that
While short-term expatriates clearly should be considered
members of U.S. society for purposes of this analysis, the
argument will generally be much weaker with reference to longterm expatriates, depending on their ties to the United States. The
argument for comparison falls apart completely in connection with
accidental, nominal, and unaware citizens, whose connection to
the United States is typically minimal to nonexistent.43
In contrast, Ruth Mason acknowledges that the ability-to-pay
argument, which views overseas citizens as having a social obligation to
support the community of which they are arguably members, has some
appeal. She notes that "although citizenship is not a perfect proxy for
national community membership, it is a better proxy across a range of cases
than at least some residence standards, particularly the substantial presence
test the United States uses to tax aliens." 44 Nonetheless, she rejects CBT
because "citizenship taxation is a poor proxy for national community
membership in many other cases,

45

and also because of administrative and

enforcement compliance concerns .46
Mason also raises efficiency concerns regarding the impact of CBT on
potential immigration to the United States.47 She argues that, at the margin,

42 Bernard Schneider, The End of Taxation Without End: A New Tax Regime for U.S.
Expatriates,32 VA. TAX REV. 1, 50 (2012).

41 Id. at 45.
44 Mason, supra note 8, at 211.

She also concludes that "the social-obligation theory

represents a more convincing fairness case for citizenship taxation" than does the benefits
theory. Id.
45 Id.
46

id. at

211-18.

41 id. at 228-29.
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[c]itizenship taxation presumably discourages both initial
migration and naturalization by marginal migrants from other
countries.... The higher the immigrant's income or wealth, the
more current U.S. law discourages her from naturalizing. For
immigrants to the United States who may be contemplating
retiring back home or moving to a third country, the citizenship
tax stands as a barrier to naturalization, and probably also to initial
migration .48

Mason argues that this disincentive will hurt the United States in
attempting to lure skilled and highly educated migrants, and accordingly
will have negative impacts on the U.S. economy. 49
1.

Proposed Alternatives to Citizenship-Based Taxation

Opponents of citizenship-based taxation generally suggest that the
United States replace it with some form of residence-based taxation for its
citizens. Under RBT (which the United States already applies to noncitizen
residents), a U.S. citizen would only be taxed on foreign income if she were
a resident of the United States.50 If the citizen did not reside in the United
States, she would not be taxed on foreign income (although, like a
nonresident noncitizen, she generally would be taxable on U.S. source
income).
While these RBT proposals share broad similarities, they differ on
many specific points. 51 For example, they reflect varying ideas on the
important threshold question of identifying when a citizen is a "resident"
for tax purposes. Avi-Yonah suggests that the United States use the same
"resident" test that currently applies to noncitizens - i.e., a three-year
weighted day count to determine "substantial presence. ,,52 Blum and Singer
48

Id.

49 Id. at 229-30. See also Daniel Shaviro, Tax Policy Colloquium, Week 6: Ruth
Mason's "Citizenship Taxation", START MAKING SENSE (Mar. 4, 2015), http:// danshaviro.

blogspot.com/2015/03/tax-policy-colloquium-week-6-ruth.html (agreeing with Mason's
assertion that CBT might discourage high-income potential immigrants from becoming
citizens).
50 Of course, a resident citizen, like a resident noncitizen, would also be taxed on U.S.

source income.
51 For an earlier critique of several of these proposals, see Kirsch, supra note 2, at

134-40.
52
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also suggest the extension of the existing substantial presence test to
citizens, but would make some modifications (e.g., applying a three-year
residence taint to a citizen who meets the substantial presence test).53 As I
previously summarized,
Schneider is more equivocal regarding the definition of tax
residence that should apply to citizens, suggesting that Congress
could either extend the substantial presence test currently
applicable to aliens, or implement a more subjective 'bona fide
residence' test based on a number of subjective factors. To the
extent the substantial presence test is extended to citizens,
Schneider, too, would modify certain aspects of it in order to
prevent perceived abuses 54
.
Mason, while not purporting to reach a definitive answer, suggests that
the United States could "move from citizenship as the sole basis for
worldwide tax to a more substantive inquiry that accounts for additional
contacts between the taxpayer and the state," 55 treating citizenship as one
factor in determining residence. For example, a citizen who maintains an
abode in the United States could be taxed on worldwide income, or
"citizenship could function as a rebuttable presumption of tax residence,
and citizens would have the burden to show that they had closer personal
and economic connections to another state. 56 Daniel Shaviro, in comments
on Mason's proposals, expresses general agreement from an efficiency
perspective, observing that "a standard that relies on several different
factors may end up, with proper design, inducing less tax-motivated
distortion overall" compared to a test that relied on a single factor, such as

http://www.procopio.com/article/tax-simplification
citizens ...

("The test to determine whether U.S.

residing overseas would be taxed as a 'resident alien' would be the same

definition as currently exists in 7701(b)(1)(A)(ii).").
53 See Blum & Singer, supra note 34, at 724-25; cf. Edward A. Zelinsky, Citizenship
and Worldwide Taxation: Citizenship as an Administrable Proxy for Domicile, 96 IOWA L.

REV. 1289, 1323-41 (2011) (discussing other countries that apply "sticky" residence rules to
their citizens, thereby retaining taxing jurisdiction for a number of years after a citizen loses
residence status). But cf. Schneider, supra note 42, at 66 (explicitly rejecting this sticky
concept of residence).
54 Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad, supra note 2, at 136
(footnotes omitted). Perhaps the most taxpayer-favorable proposal is that put forth by the
overseas-citizens advocacy group, American Citizens Abroad, which would defer to the

taxpayer's self-certification to determine whether she is a U.S. tax resident. See id. at 12940 (critiquing the American Citizens Abroad proposal).
55 Mason, supra note 8, at 232.
56 Id. at 231-32.
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citizenship. 57 He acknowledges, however, that the "fiend or goblin ... is in
the details. 58 In a later article, Shaviro notes that an individual's physical
location and mental status are the "two factors that would appear clearly to
59
have strong intuitive appeal.
Most proponents of RBT acknowledge that some type of "exit tax"
would be needed to prevent citizens from abandoning U.S. residence
shortly before selling their assets and thereby avoiding U.S. tax on the gains
that accrued during U.S. residence. 60 The exit tax is, in effect, a specific
anti-abuse provision aimed at addressing one of the more obvious ways that
taxpayers could utilize tax-motivated residence changes in order to reduce
their U.S. tax liability (some RBT proponents suggest that additional antiabuse provisions might also be needed). 61 Most RBT exit tax proposals are
loosely based on Internal Revenue Code section 877A, which currently
imposes a mark-to-market regime on citizens who lose their citizenship. 62
While the current provision triggers gain (above a threshold amount) when
certain citizens "exit" the tax system by renouncing or otherwise losing
U.S. citizenship, under the RBT proposal gain would be triggered when a
citizen "exits" the tax system by changing her residence. The RBT
proposals vary as to the sensitivity of this triggering event. Schneider's
proposal, for example, would trigger the tax whenever a citizen shifts from
tax resident to nonresident status,63 while Blum and Singer's proposal,

because of its three-year residence status taint, would not automatically
trigger the exit tax when the individual moved. 64 Avi-Yonah proposes an
even less sensitive trigger, imposing the exit tax only on citizens who are
65
tax residents for at least eight of the past fifteen years prior to departure.
Mason, noting some concerns with the application of exit taxes, suggests
that they might be made elective, so that a citizen, upon becoming a
nonresident, could choose to either remain subject to the worldwide tax
regime or could choose to incur the exit tax.66
57 Shaviro, supra note 49.
58 Id.
59 Shaviro, supra note 8, at 21.
60 See, e.g., AvI-YONAH & MARTIN, supra note 52, at 8-9; Blum & Singer, supra note
34, at 731-32; Schneider, supra note 42, at 66-67; see also Kirsch, Revisiting the Taxation
of Citizens Abroad, supra note 2, at 136-39.
61 Mason, supra note 8, at 233-36.
62 See Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad, supra note 2, at 137

n.86.
63 Schneider, supra note 42, at 66-68.
64 Blum & Singer, supra note 34, at 732-38.
65 AVI-YONAH & MARTIN, supra note 52, at 9.
66 Mason, supra note 8, at 234-35.
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In addition to addressing the definition of "resident" (and the potential
consequences, if any, of a change in residence status), RBT proposals need
to address the manner in which the U.S. will tax nonresident citizens. In
particular, should the U.S. merely apply the current tax regime applicable to
nonresident noncitizens, or should nonresident citizens be taxed differently
than nonresident noncitizens? The RBT proposals vary in this regard.
Under Avi-Yonah's proposal, nonresident citizens "would become subject
to U.S. income and withholding taxation the same as other non-resident
aliens. ' 67 Presumably, this approach would allow nonresident citizens to
claim the same exclusions currently available to nonresident aliens,
including the non-taxation of U.S. bank deposit interest, portfolio interest
on U.S. corporate debt instruments, and gain from the disposition of most
stock in U.S. companies. 68
One final point deserves mention in the context of alternatives to CBT.
As I have observed elsewhere, the RBT proposals generally focus on
income tax concerns and often gloss over the significant estate and gift tax
concerns that could arise in the absence of CBT.69 Indeed, for many
wealthy citizens, a shift to RBT in the transfer tax setting would open
significantly more tax planning opportunities than would a shift to RBT in
the income tax setting.7 °
III. DISTILLING THE UNDERLYING NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS

As Part I illustrates, both proponents and opponents of CBT invoke
e.g., fairness, efficiency, and
traditional tax policy norms administrability - in support of their position. Having summarized the
principal arguments for and against CBT and RBT, this Part II now focuses
on these norms in more detail, analyzing how well the various RBT
proposals, as well as the CBT regime, furthers them. In addition, this Part
addresses the impact of CBT and the RBT proposals on other normative
values beyond the traditional tax policy norms, with special emphasis on
the impact on social cohesion.
A. Fairness:Ability-to-Pay Principles
As discussed above, citizenship constitutes a significant communal tie
67 AVI-YONAH & MARTIN, supra note 52, at 8.

68 With respect to gains, Avi-Yonah would impose a mark-to-market tax upon
becoming a nonresident, but only if the citizen had been a U.S. tax resident for at least eight
of the past fifteen years. AvI-YONAH & MARTIN, supranote 52, at 9.
69 Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatmentof Citizens Abroad, supra note 2, at 139-40.
70 Id. at 200-05.
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between the individual and the country of citizenship.
I believe this tie
generally is sufficient to bring non-resident citizens within the community
of those who are expected to share the financial burden of supporting the
United States under its ability-to-pay-based progressive income tax system.
1. Lack of Pure Ability-to-Pay Principles under Current Law
Some critics of CBT, however, have observed that aspects of the
current CBT-based system (in particular, the foreign earned income
exclusion and foreign tax credit) allow many U.S. citizens living abroad to
pay less U.S. income tax, and therefore provide less financial support for
the U.S. community, than a U.S.-resident citizen with similar income. 72
Thus, it is argued that the current system itself does not reflect ability-topay principles, and thus these principles provide weak justification for
continuing a CBT regime. While this argument correctly points out that the
current regime does not reflect pure ability-to-pay principles, such
principles still remain a central part of the regime. The regime, by backing
off of taxation for some foreign income of citizens abroad, is merely
acknowledging that there are competing concerns in the international
context. 73 In the modern mobile world, it is possible that an individual can
be a member of multiple communities simultaneously. Indeed, even if all
countries adopted RBT regimes, an individual could still be a tax resident
of two (or more) countries, given the lack of uniformity in countries'
definitions of "resident." Moreover, even under an RBT regime, if the
residence country taxes its resident's worldwide income, it typically will
allow a foreign tax credit in order to prevent double-taxation. In such
circumstances, the residence country should not be seen as abandoning
ability-to-pay principles for its community members (however defined);
rather, it should be viewed as allowing concerns related to double-taxation
to trump pure ability-to-pay concerns.
As I previously observed, similar reasoning applies when the United
States allows an overseas citizen to claim a foreign tax credit:

71 See supra notes 19-31 and accompanying text.
72 See, e.g., Zelinsky, supra note 32, at 1319-22; Mason, supra note 8, at 209; AviYonah, supra note 38, at 393; see also Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens
Abroad, supra note 2, at 126 n.33 and accompanying text. In some cases (e.g., an individual
whose only income is foreign earned income that is less than the foreign earned income
exclusion amount, or all of whose income is foreign source income that is taxed by a foreign

country at relatively high tax rates), the individual might not owe any residual U.S. income
tax.
73 These concerns also extend to citizens residing within the United States, as reflected

in the availability of the foreign tax credit for these individuals.
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[I]n this context the foreign tax credit, in addition to alleviating
double taxation, could be viewed as an acknowledgement by the
United States that the citizen living abroad is a part of two
societies, with the United States ceding primary taxing rights to
the country where the individual has the more immediate current
connection. But to the extent that the foreign country finances its
activities with a level of income tax that is lower than that imposed
by the United States, the residual amount of taxes should be paid
to help support the United States, where the individual also
maintains a voluntary societal connection.7 4
Thus, the ability of an overseas citizen to reduce her U.S. tax liability
by the foreign tax credit does not necessarily undermine ability-to-pay
arguments for CBT. Indeed, even if the U.S. were to shift to an RBT
regime, a U.S. citizen who resides in the United States but has foreign
income would be allowed to claim a foreign tax credit (just as U.S.-resident
citizens in such circumstances can do under the current regime), yet we
generally don't view such a concession (which exists today) as undermining
the general ability-to-pay principles underlying the U.S. income tax system.
Admittedly, the foreign earned income exclusion - by eliminating
75
U.S. income tax on approximately $100,000 of foreign earned income is less consistent with the ability-to-pay perspective that treats overseas
citizens as having sufficient communal ties to impose CBT. Nonetheless,
the existence of the foreign earned income exclusion does not significantly
undermine the view that overseas citizens generally are part of the United
States community for CBT purposes. First, it could be argued that the
foreign earned income exclusion is an unjustified policy, and rather than
use its existence to argue for the repeal of CBT, the foreign earned income
exclusion itself could be repealed. 76 Assuming that the exclusion is
retained, in some circumstances the exclusion may merely operate as an
administratively simpler proxy for the foreign tax credit (e.g., a citizen
abroad whose moderate foreign earned income is taxed at a relatively high
tax rate in the foreign country), or as a relatively moderate concession to the
compliance issues and other complexities that citizens living abroad might
face. To the extent that a citizen abroad has a higher level of earned
income, the foreign earned income exclusion will not shelter all (or, in the
74 Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad, supra note 2, at 126 n.33.

71 I.R.C. § 911. See Rev. Proc. 2016-55, 2016-45 I.R.B. 707 for inflation adjustments.
76 For a more detailed critique of the foreign earned income exclusion, see Kirsch,
Taxing Citizens, supra note 2, at 523-24. See also Mason, supra note 8, at 209 (noting that a

pure ability-to-pay rationale for CBT would require the repeal of the foreign earned income
exclusion and the allowance of unlimited foreign tax credits).
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case of very high income levels, much) of it, and the U.S. citizen will still
owe U.S. taxes under general ability-to-pay principles. Similarly, to the
extent the individual's income is from investments, the exclusion will not
shelter U.S. tax on any of it, thereby preserving the application of ability-topay principles. In a related argument, Ruth Mason argues that
[ilf substantial connections and full national community
membership trigger full moral obligations to contribute taxes
according to ability to pay, then more limited connections and
partial membership may trigger more limited tax obligations. One
thing is clear: since the social-obligation theory determines the
amount of a person's tax liability by reference to her ability to pay,
the theory should not result in full tax liability to multiple
societies. If multiple and partial national community memberships
are possible, the question then becomes how a taxpayer's
obligation should be divided among the states in which she is a
member .7

After observing that tax treaties generally implement a winner-take-all tiebreaker for dual tax residents, she observes that "despite the tie-breaker
rules and the U.S. saving clause, the citizenship tax does not result in
winner-take-all taxation. 7 8
Instead, due to the foreign tax credit,
citizenship-based taxation "may result in splitting the individual's socialobligation contribution across two states., 79 While she concedes that this
may be the fair result when the nonresident American is viewed as a
member of both national communities, in cases "where the nonresident
American is no longer a member of the U.S. national community, her
residual taxation by the United States is less fair than would be a winnertake-all approach that awarded to her residence state the exclusive authority
to tax her worldwide income.' 80 This argument, however, assumes that the
overseas citizen is "no longer a member of the U.S. national community."
As discussed above, a strong case can be made that the retention of
citizenship itself should, as a general matter, cause the individual to be
considered part of the national community.

77 Mason, supra note 8, at 206.
78 Id. at 207.
79 Id.
80 Id.
8 See supra notes 19-31 and accompanying text.
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Special Treatment of Citizens Under RBT Proposals

The connection of overseas citizens to the U.S. community is
(implicitly) reinforced by some arguments raised by supporters of RBT.
82
While some RBT proponents - most notably, Reuven Avi-Yonah would treat nonresident citizens in much the same way that nonresident
noncitizens are treated, others envision separate rules. For example,
Cynthia Blum and Paula Singer propose a three-year residence taint on
test, 83
citizens who cease being residents under the substantial presence
while Bernard Schneider suggests a subjective bona fide residence test for
citizens (while noncitizens presumably would continue to use the
substantial presence test).84 Ruth Mason considers a number of possible
tests that would move away from citizenship taxation, but not all the way to
strict residence taxation, such as a focus on whether a citizen (but not a
noncitizen) maintains an abode in the United States, or a rebuttable
presumption that a citizen (but not a noncitizen) has a tax residence in the
United States.85
The further these proposals go in treating nonresident citizens
differently from nonresident noncitizens, the more they implicitly
In
acknowledge that there is something special about citizenship.
particular, they seem to acknowledge that a citizen living abroad, even for
an extended period, retains a special connection to the United States that a
nonresident noncitizen does not. While these RBT proponents most likely
would argue that whatever connection is retained is not sufficient to justify
the perpetual taxation of a nonresident citizen's foreign source income, that
admitted connection nonetheless suggests that there is a special tie for
citizens that does not apply to noncitizens, thereby providing at least some
further support for the view that a citizen is part of the U.S. community.
3.

Relevance of Accidental, Nominal, and Unaware Citizens

CBT opponents also suggest that the communal-ties argument for
ability-to-pay taxation, although it may have relevance for overseas citizens
who were raised in the United States and plan to return there, is much less
persuasive for specific subgroups of overseas citizens - so-called
"accidental," "nominal," or "unaware" or "unknowing" citizens - thereby
82 See supra note 52 and accompanying text; see also supra note 65 and accompanying
text ("Avi-Yonah proposes an even less sensitive trigger, imposing the exit tax only on
citizens who are tax residents for at least eight of the past fifteen years prior to departure.").
83 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
84 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
85 See Mason, supra note 8, at 231-33.
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undermining the general case for CBT.86 In this context, "accidental
citizens" are those "who were born in the United States to noncitizen
parents temporarily present in the country on a short-term basis and who
left the country soon thereafter, 87 while "nominal" citizens are those "who
were born abroad to a U.S. citizen parent (or parents) and acquired
citizenship by descent, even though the individuals may have little or no
connection to the United States and may never have lived here, held a U.S.
passport, or otherwise derived any benefit from U.S. citizenship status. 88
At the extreme, "unaware" or "unknowing" citizens are those "accidental"
or "nominal" citizens who were "not even aware of their status as a U.S.
citizen" 89 until discovering it in the context of a tax compliance situation.
This latter group "could include, for example, individuals born outside the
United States who were not aware of the identity, much less the U.S.
citizenship status, of a biological parent." 90 The Service has reported that in
some cases, the U.S. citizenship status was only discovered by an
unknowing citizen's executor after her death. 9 '
Each of these subgroups raises different concerns in the context of
ability-to-pay analysis. Obviously, an unknowing citizen presents the
weakest case for CBT. It is difficult to argue that a person who is unaware
of her U.S. citizenship status (and whom the State Department presumably
does not know is a U.S. citizen) has any meaningful communal ties to the
United States, such that she should be expected to financially support the
country (at least with respect to the period when she was unaware). Of
course, as a practical matter, as long as the individual and the United States
are both unaware of her citizenship status, her potential CBT liability is a
moot point. However, even after she (or her executor) becomes aware of
her citizenship, the communal-ties argument would be a weak basis upon
86 See Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad, supra note 2, at 13233.
17

Id. at 133.

88

Id.

89

Id.

90

DEP'T OF TREAS., INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE BY U.S. CITIZENS AND U.S. LAWFUL

39
The

PERMANENT RESIDENTS RESIDING OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES AND RELATED ISSUES

(1998),

http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/tax598.pdf.

report also addresses "restored" citizens (i.e., those who were treated as having lost

citizenship under an erroneous interpretation of the law by the State Department, but whose
citizenship was subsequently restored), and treats them similarly to "unknowing" citizens
during the period before their citizenship was restored. Id. at 40-41. (In the interest of
disclosure, it should be noted that the author assisted in the drafting of that report while

working at the Service.).
9 Id. at 39 (the "IRS has received numerous inquiries from executors of foreign estates
who have concluded that the decedent technically was a U.S. citizen but did not know it.").

2017]

Social Cohesion and Tax

which to attempt to collect income (or estate) taxes for prior years (if, for
example, the Service argued that the period of limitations for income tax
assessment remained open due to the failure to file a past U.S. tax return), 92
if the
and also has only limited relevance going forward, particularly 93
thereafter.
soon
citizenship
newly-discovered
the
individual abandons
While the normative case for taxing unknowing citizens is weak, the
difficulty arises in creating an objective and enforceable test for identifying
these individuals and exempting them from taxation. In the absence of an
appropriate test, an individual who knows of her citizenship status may,
nonetheless, act as an "unknowing" citizen for purposes of not paying
taxes, yet may someday invoke citizenship (e.g., by claiming a recent
discovery of such status) if citizenship status becomes beneficial for nontax purposes (e.g., if the person decides to move to the United States). The
Treasury Department, in a 1998 report on overseas citizens, considered a
possible exemption for unknowing citizens who later discover their
citizenship status, suggesting that "[a]n individual claiming the benefit of
this [possible] exemption should bear the burden of proving that he or she
had no knowledge of his or her U.S. citizenship during the period at
issue, 94 and further noting that "[b]ecause of the possibility of abuse, the
criteria for lacking knowledge of U.S. citizenship should be strictly
Relevant factors could include the "absence of past
construed. 95
statements to the U.S. government claiming citizenship (e.g., passport
applications and filings for government benefits as a citizen), 9 6 and "past
statements indicating a belief that he or she is not a U.S. citizen (e.g.,
applications for employment, applications to educational institutions,
financial transaction documentation, foreign tax returns, request for a visa
for travel to the United States, and entering the United States on a foreign
passport). 97 The Treasury Department report's proposal also suggested
that:
92

Cf. I.R.C. § 6501 (c)(3) (stating that in the case of a failure to file a return, income

tax may be assessed at any time). This issue may be particularly relevant in the case of the
estate tax, when a nonresident decedent may have had no knowledge of her U.S. citizenship
status while alive, but such status is identified by her executor after her death. As the

Service mentioned in a 1998 report, the "IRS has received numerous inquiries from
executors of foreign estates who have concluded that the decedent technically was a U.S.
citizen but did not know it." DEP'T OF TREAS., supra note 90, at 39.
93 Cf. DEP'T OF TREAS., supra note 90, at 40 (suggesting an abandonment of citizenship

status within six months of discovery under such circumstances).
94

Id. at 39.

95 id.
96

id.

9'

Id. at 39-40.
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Once an individual becomes aware of his or her U.S. citizenship
or, based on objective facts, should have become aware of such
status, the individual could under this regime have a period of time
(e.g., six months) to abandon that status without U.S. tax
consequences .

. .,

so long as he or she does not utilize the benefits

of citizenship during that period.9 8
As noted above, this final aspect of the proposal is consistent with a
communal-ties rationale for taxing the individual for subsequent periods if
she chooses to retain citizenship beyond a reasonable period after becoming
aware of it.

99

The appropriate treatment of "nominal" or "accidental" citizens under a
communal-ties argument is not as clear. The mere fact that a person was
born abroad and acquired citizenship by descent (and therefore might be
viewed as a "nominal" citizen under the taxonomy discussed above) does
not necessarily suggest that she does not have significant ties to the United
States. While some such individuals may feel little or no subjective
connection to the United States, and have no plans to visit, let alone live,
here, other such individuals may have strong subjective ties. While it is not
possible to know the precise numbers (or even relative numbers) of
individuals who fit each of these profiles, the number in the latter group
presumably is significant. After all, American Citizens Abroad ("ACA"), a
prominent lobbying group that represents the interests of overseas citizens,
has expended significant efforts to ensure that the estimated 40,000
individuals born abroad to a U.S. citizen parent (or parents) are able to
claim U.S. citizenship. 0 0 In advocating for citizens born abroad, ACA
emphasizes "its support of revised legislation to make it easier to transmit
US citizenship to children born or adopted abroad,"'0 ' noting that U.S.
citizenship "opens the door to membership in our society and all other

related rights.' 0 2
Similar issues arise with so-called "accidental" citizens, who obtained
citizenship because their parents were temporarily present in the United
States at the time of their birth. Some of these citizens may have little or no
subjective connection to the United States, while others may place
significant value on their citizenship and may plan at some point to live in
the United States. While it is also difficult to know the relative numbers of

98 Id. at 40.
99 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
1oo Citizenship,AMERICAN CITIZENS ABROAD, https://americansabroad.org/citizenship.
101 Id.
102 Id. (emphasis added).
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individuals within each of these subgroups, recent news reports suggest a
significant increase in the number of individuals obtaining U.S. citizenship
because of intentional efforts by their non-citizen mother to visit the United
States in anticipation of delivery. In particular, news reports estimate that
approximately 60,000 births occurred in the United States to Chinese
nationals taking part in "birth tourism" in 2014. °3 While these U.S. citizen
infants presumably will return to China and be raised there, their U.S.
citizenship may be very important to them, and many might be expected to
move to the United States at some future time.
Given the broad range of circumstances faced by "nominal" or
"accidental" citizens, the suggestion by some scholars that the plight of
these citizens broadly undermines the case for CBT seems overstated.
Many of these citizens can be viewed as having significant ongoing ties to
the United States. Accordingly, under a communal-ties argument, such
individuals would not automatically be excluded from the group of
individuals expected to support the country. Instead, as with "unknowing"
citizens, perhaps an exemption could be enacted for those who satisfy an
objective and enforceable test establishing their minimal ties. Such an
exemption could be based, for example, on Code section 877A(g)(1)(B),
which exempts certain dual citizens, and certain minors, who have limited
U.S. contacts from the application of the exit tax upon loss of citizenship.0 4
4.

Do We Tax Because We Care?

Some might object to the ability-to-pay argument because of the
"apparent paradox, or at least conundrum," that "only if we decide that we
care about you [] will we impose tax burdens on you.' 1 5 As I understand
this concern, it implies some type of causation - i.e., we care about you,
and therefore we will tax you. I, however, believe that causation runs in a
slightly different direction. Both the "caring for" and "taxing" flow from
the first principle that citizenship makes you a member of the community
(at least as argued previously). The reason U.S.-resident citizens care about
citizens abroad (to the extent they do) is because citizenship is viewed as
103 See Matt Sheehan, Born in the USA: Why Chinese "Birth Tourism" is Booming in

California, WORLDPOST (May 1, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/205/O5/O1/chinaus-birth-tourism n 7187180.html.

"' Under I.R.C. § 877A(g)(1)(B)(i), an individual is exempt from the exit tax if she, at
birth, became a citizen of the United States and another country, she continues to be taxed as

a resident of that other country, and she has been a resident of the United States for not more
than 10 of the preceding 15 taxable years. Under I.R.C. § 877A(g)(1)(B)(ii), an individual is
exempt from the exit tax if she relinquishes U.S. citizenship before attaining age 18

she has been a U.S. resident for no more than 10 taxable years.
105 Shaviro, supra note 8, at 5.
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making them one of us. We don't know the overseas citizen personally, but
because of citizenship status, we view them as part of our community.
Similarly, we tax the person because we view citizenship as making them a
part of the community, with an obligation to support the community.
Accordingly, both the care we have for an overseas citizen (relative to a
random noncitizen living abroad) and the taxation imposed on an overseas
citizen flow from the idea that citizenship makes them part of community
(rather than taxation of the citizen flowing from our caring about the
citizen).
5.

Inclusion of Noncitizen Residents in Community?

A final possible objection to including overseas citizens within the
ability-to-pay community concerns the treatment of U.S. residents who are
not citizens. Reuven Avi-Yonah, after acknowledging that the ability-topay argument for taxing nonresident citizens based on their communal ties
"could be appealing if we only taxed citizens," rejects the argument because
we also treat resident aliens as part of the relevant ability-to-pay
community.' ° 6 Avi-Yonah apparently assumes that the relevant community
can only be defined by a single factor - either citizenship or residence and he implicitly concludes that residence trumps. It is not clear to me
why, if indeed only one factor can be chosen, residence should
automatically trump and citizenship should be discounted. After all, it is
possible that many resident citizens (rightly or wrongly) feel a stronger
subjective connection to other U.S. citizens, regardless of the other citizens'
residence, than they feel toward noncitizens residing in the United States.
This stronger connection might be gleaned from the restrictions on social
safety net benefits that each group faces. While nonresident citizens do not
receive certain benefits, such as Food Stamps, Medicaid, and Medicare
coverage while living outside the United States, these restrictions may be
based on "a host of administrative and design problems," including
questions about benefits delivery, that arise in a cross-border setting. ° 7 In
contrast, resident noncitizens (in particular, unauthorized immigrants) do
not qualify for a host of benefits, such as Food Stamps or Medicaid
coverage (other than certain emergency care), even though these benefits
would not raise cross-border administrative design or delivery problems.
This denial suggests that, at least in some contexts, resident noncitizens
106 Avi-Yonah, The Case Against Taxing Citizens, 58 TAx NOTES INT'L 389, 393 (May

3,2010).
107 See Shaviro, supra note 8, at 22-23. Shaviro concludes, though, that despite these
practical problems, "we are inclined to care somewhat less about our own people when they
are abroad for extended periods, rather than living among us." Id. at 23.
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may be viewed (rightly or wrongly) as having weaker community ties than
nonresident citizens. Accordingly, if a communal ties-based ability-to-pay
argument can be made only with respect to one of these two groups, the
argument may be even stronger with respect to nonresident citizens.
More fundamentally, however, I do not agree that only one factor can
be relevant in defining the community under ability-to-pay principles. As
Dan Shaviro notes, "two factors that would appear clearly to have strong
intuitive appeal, when one thinks about the 'us' category, are (a) people's
physical location and (b) something about their mental states, be this
focused on their connections, sense of personal identity, or intentions
regarding the future.' ' 8 He later suggests that citizenship could come
within this latter category. 109 Resident noncitizens might be viewed as part
of the community (with a responsibility to support it) based on their current
physical presence, while nonresident citizens might be viewed as part of the
community based on the factors discussed previously, including their
possible future physical return (among other factors). While in many cases
the two factors (residence and citizenship) will overlap (in the case of the
hundreds of millions of citizens who reside in the United States), the
relevance of the two factors is not mutually exclusive.
B. Efficiency - Competing Views

Advocates of both CBT and RBT rely, in part, on efficiency claims,
suggesting that their preferred approach will distort individuals' decisions
less than other approaches. However, in making these arguments, they
focus on different margins. ° Opponents of CBT generally focus on
citizenship neutrality - i.e., CBT's impact on an individual's decision of
whether or not to retain U.S. citizenship. In contrast, proponents of CBT
generally focus on residence neutrality - i.e., RBT's impact on an
individual's decision of where to establish and maintain residence for tax
purposes.
1. Citizenship Neutrality Concerns
Under a CBT regime, an individual's tax liability (for both income and
transfer tax purposes) generally does not depend on her residence status.
Merely moving abroad does not significantly impact the individual's U.S.

108 Shaviro, supra note 8, at 21.

"'

Id. at 23.

110 See generally Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad, supra note 2,

at 181-200 (discussing competing views of neutrality between CBT and RBT advocates).
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tax liability. "11 Accordingly, a CBT regime generally is residence-neutral,
and does not impact a citizen's residence decision.
While CBT does not create an incentive to move abroad, once an
individual is living abroad it might create an incentive to surrender U.S.
citizenship. Under CBT, the taxation of a nonresident's foreign source
income (as well as some U.S. source income)' 12 generally turns on whether
or not the individual is a U.S. citizen. Accordingly, it is not surprising that
a CBT regime might encourage some nonresident citizens to surrender their
U.S. citizenship, thereby potentially violating citizenship neutrality
principles.
Despite this tax-motivated incentive, until relatively recently few
individuals actually engaged in tax-motivated abandonment of citizenship.
It is only in the past few years that the number of tax-motivated
abandonments has increased (although the totals still remain relatively
small). As I previously summarized:
Between 1998 and 2005, the number of individuals who
surrendered or otherwise lost their U.S. citizenship gradually
increased from approximately 400 per year to approximately 800
per year. Data for early years going back to 1991 reflects a similar
number of annual renunciations. Because citizens who surrender
citizenship are not required to give a reason, there is no way to
know how many of these individuals surrendered citizenship for
tax reasons. While a number of high-profile individuals who
surrendered citizenship in those earlier years apparently did so for
tax purposes, a significant number of individuals did so for nontax
reasons.
The number of reported citizenship losses dropped significantly in
2006 through 2008. The reported number had dwindled to 167 for
the 12-month period ending in the middle of 2009. However,
beginning with the report for the third quarter of 2009, the number
Specific features of the United States' existing CBT regime -

earned income exclusion and foreign tax credit limitations -

e.g., the foreign

might cause minor distortion.

For example, the foreign earned income exclusion, by allowing a citizen living abroad to

exclude approximately $100,000 (plus limited housing expenses) from gross income, could
create an incentive to reside abroad. I.R.C. § 911. See Rev. Proc. 2016-55, 2016-45 I.R.B.

707 for inflation adjustments. However, the tax savings from this limited exclusion would
probably be a relatively minor factor in any decision to move abroad, relative to the non-tax

costs (e.g., financial and cultural) involved in the decision.
12 As a general matter, a nonresident non-citizen is not taxed on capital gain from the
sale of U.S. corporate stock, as well as certain types of U.S. source interest. See generally
I.R.S. Pub. No. 519 (2016).
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of reported losses of citizenship began to increase dramatically,
resulting in 742 losses reported in calendar year 2009. 1,534 in
2010, and 1,781 in 2011. After a brief drop during 2012 (932)
(which may have been attributable, at least in part, to anticipation
that tax rates might be lowered and that the overseas enforcement
initiatives would be scaled back if Mitt Romney were to be elected
President), the reported losses again increased significantly with
3,000 renunciations reported in 2013.' 13
4
This upward trend continued in 2014, with 3,415 losses reported,"
and in 2015, with 1,795 reported during the first half of the year.'15
This recent uptick in the number of renunciations is most likely due to
increased Service enforcement efforts, particularly with respect to the
information reporting requirements for overseas accounts (e.g., FBAR
forms and related penalties), as well as the implementation of the FATCA
regime, which will enable the Service to obtain information (including, but
not limited to, information on accounts held by citizens residing overseas)
from foreign financial institutions.' 16 Prior to these recent enforcement
efforts, a significant number of U.S. citizens may have been living abroad
without complying with their U.S. tax burdens (either because they were
not aware of them, or because they discounted the Service's ability to
enforce the laws). To the extent the recent developments with FBAR and
FATCA enforcement caused these individuals to pay attention to their
potential U.S. tax liability, it is not surprising that a number of these
individuals may have decided that the benefits of retaining U.S. citizenship
113 Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad, supra note 2, at 181-84

(footnotes omitted).
See Quarterly Publication of Individuals, Who Have Chosen to Expatriate, as
Required by Section 6039G, 80 Fed. Reg. 7685 (Feb. 11, 2015) (1,062 individuals reported
''4

for the quarter ending December 31, 2014); Quarterly Publication of Individuals, Who Have
Chosen to Expatriate, as Required by Section 6039G, 79 Fed. Reg. 64,013 (Oct. 27, 2014)
(776 individuals reported for the quarter ending September 30, 2014); Quarterly Publication
of Individuals, Who Have Chosen to Expatriate, as Required by Section 6039G, 79 Fed.
Reg. 46,306 (Aug. 7, 2014) (576 individuals reported for the quarter ending June 30, 2014);

Quarterly Publication of Individuals, Who Have Chosen to Expatriate, as Required by
Section 6039G, 79 Fed. Reg. 25,176 (May 2, 2014) (1,001 individuals reported for the
quarter ending March 31, 2014).
''5 See Quarterly Publication of Individuals, Who Have Chosen to Expatriate, as
Required by Section 6039G, 80 Fed. Reg. 45,709 (July 31, 2015) (460 individuals reported

for the quarter ending June 30, 2015); Quarterly Publication of Individuals, Who Have
Chosen to Expatriate, as Required by Section 6039G, 80 Fed. Reg. 26,618 (May 8, 2015)
(1,335 individuals reported for the quarter ending March 31, 2015).

116 For a detailed analysis of these increased reporting requirements, and their potential
impact on overseas citizens, see Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad,
supra note 2, at 140-81,210-21.
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did not justify the tax costs of contributing to U.S. society. Given that these
individuals may be the ones who have the most tenuous subjective
connections to the United States, their citizenship renunciation is not
necessarily inconsistent with the communal-ties justification underlying
17
CBT. 1
The recent increase in citizenship renunciation may be driven not only
by concerns about increased U.S. tax liability, but also, at least in part, by
the significant U.S. tax compliance costs associated with living overseas.
For example, the additional filing requirements applicable to overseas
citizens often require these citizens to incur significant accounting and other
professional fees, even if their U.S. tax liability is relatively modest (or
zero). 118 Moreover, an overseas citizen with a foreign financial account
potentially could be subject to significant failure-to-file penalties, even if no
U.S. tax is owed. 19 Under these circumstances, it is possible that at least
some U.S. citizens who, at the margin, might prefer to retain their
citizenship and would be willing to pay residual U.S. tax, if any, after
application of the foreign tax credit and foreign earned income exclusion,
might decide nonetheless to surrender their citizenship. Such compliancecost driven expatriations are particularly problematic, potentially driving
away (at least at the margin) individuals who otherwise would prefer to
remain part of the extended U.S. community (paying residual U.S. taxes),
without providing any commensurate benefit to the United States in return.
As I have previously argued, these compliance-cost driven expatriations are
best addressed by the Service and Congress taking the unique
circumstances faced by overseas citizens more seriously when
implementing compliance and enforcement rules. 2 °
Regardless of whether the recent uptick in citizenship surrenders is
caused by concerns over U.S. tax liability itself or, more problematically,
concerns about compliance costs, it is important to keep in mind that the
absolute numbers of individuals surrendering citizenship remains relatively
small in absolute terms. Moreover, as I have previously observed, "it is not
unreasonable to assume that at some point, those who are most likely to
renounce citizenship for tax-related purposes will have done so, and the
numbers may trend down again. ,,121

117 See supra notes 19-31 and accompanying text.
118 [cite estimates]
119 See Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad, supra note 2, at 161-

72.
120 Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad, supra note 2, at 212-15.
121

Id. at 186-87.
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Residence Neutrality Concerns

In contrast to the current CBT regime, which largely eliminates the
importance of a citizen's residence, an RBT regime places significant
emphasis on an individual's residence. Under RBT, the taxation of an
122
individual's foreign source income (as well as some U.S. source income)
generally turns on whether or not the individual is a U.S. tax resident.
Accordingly, the use of an RBT regime (and elimination of CBT) for
citizens might encourage some citizens to become nonresident individuals
for tax purposes, thereby potentially violating residence neutrality
principles. Such a regime, however, would be consistent with citizenship
neutrality principles, because the nonresident's citizenship status would not
be relevant for U.S. tax purposes, and thus there would be no tax incentive
to surrender citizenship.
Some proponents, implicitly relying on the historic lack of tax-driven
changes of residence by U.S. citizens, downplay the extent to which an
RBT regime would incentive citizens to move abroad. 23 As I have
previously noted, however:
these appeals to the [current] lack of tax motive for citizens living
abroad fail to acknowledge the important role that current
citizenship-based taxation, with its limited potential for tax
windfalls by moving abroad, plays in this result. The situation
might change significantly if the United States were to move to a
residence-based tax system for citizens. While many citizens
would continue to live abroad primarily for nontax reasons, a
residence-based tax system might create significant incentives for
many other U.S. citizens to move abroad primarily for tax reasons.
After all, under a residence-based tax system, a U.S. citizen
residing abroad (unlike a citizen residing in the United States)
would no longer be taxed on income arising outside the United
States. Indeed, she might not even be taxed on significant types of
income arising within the United States, such as interest on U.S.
bank accounts or gains from the sale of stock in U.S. companies.
122 As a general matter, under U.S. tax law a nonresident is not taxed on capital gain
from the sale of U.S. corporate stock, or on certain types of U.S. source interest. See
generally I.R.S. Pub. No. 519 (2016).
123 See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 38, at 390 n.5 ("in the case of individuals, I believe
the decision to move is usually motivated primarily by nontax considerations"); Schneider,
supra note 42, at 53 ("In most cases ... individuals choose their residence on the basis of
more than just taxation .... The United States should not assume that a move abroad is

motivated by a desire to decrease U.S. tax liability and therefore should be ignored for tax
purposes.").
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In addition, a U.S. citizen residing abroad could significantly
reduce or eliminated U.S. gift and estate tax liability. 24
The precise extent to which citizens at the margin would establish a
foreign residence if the United States moved to an RBT-focused regime is
difficult to quantify. Much recent writing focuses on the recent increase in
labor mobility.125 While moderate-income individuals whose income
depends on selling their labor might not be likely to change residence due
to tax changes (due to the modest expected tax savings and the possible
difficulty of obtaining similar employment abroad), high-income
individuals (particularly those whose income depends largely on returns to
capital rather than selling their labor) might have much greater flexibility.
Not only do they have greater locational flexibility (given that they can
perform their investing activities from anywhere), but the potential amount
of tax savings for such an individual could be significant. Even some highincome workers might be induced to establish foreign residence if their
potential tax savings are high enough and their profession allows for
geographic residence flexibility (e.g., some professional athletes, some
126
medical professionals who can perform their work remotely, etc.).
Of course, a number of non-tax factors would influence a U.S. citizen's
decision to move abroad, including "personal and family history, social or
cultural connections, nationality status, economic opportunities, and climate
preferences. ,,127 Moreover, the decision might be influenced by the
definition of "resident" implemented in the RBT regime - in particular,
the extent to which it would require the individual to limit the amount of
time spent in the United States each year. But if the potential income (or,
perhaps more importantly, gift and estate) tax savings are sufficient, a
significant number of individuals might change residence (at least for a
sufficient amount of time to gain significant tax advantages). The
experience of individuals moving among the U.S. states (which, admittedly,
involves fewer cultural changes that would a foreign move) demonstrates
that high-income (and high net worth) individuals are often willing to

124 Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad, supra note 2, at 188-89.
125 See, e.g., Ruth Mason, Tax Expenditures and Global Labor Mobility, 84 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1540 (2009); Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Income Tax Discrimination:Still
Stuck in the Labyrinth of Impossibility, 121 YALE L.J. 1118 (2012).
126 Cf. Michael S. Kirsch, The Role of Physical Presence in the Taxation of CrossBorder Personal Services, 51 B.C. L. REV. 993 (2010) (discussing the increased geographic

flexibility of cross-border services, due to advances in global communication technology,
and the resulting tax complications).
127 Kirsch, Taxing Citizens, supra note 2, at 489.
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change residence for significant tax savings.' 28 More importantly, the
experience of other countries suggests that individuals, under an RBT
regime, are willing to change national residence if the tax savings are
sufficient.129 As I have previously observed, if the United States shifted to
taxing its citizens only under an RBT regime, thereby creating a market
among other countries to attract high-income and high-worth U.S. citizens,
it is likely that a number of countries might tailor their tax and immigration
regimes to attract these wealthy U.S. citizens. 3 °
Some scholars have argued that, from a global welfare perspective, an
RBT regime could lead to increased efficiency. Reuven Avi-Yonah
suggested that
We should go back to Charles Tiebout's famous conclusion from
1956 that if people are mobile, countries should set tax rates to
reflect the taste of their residents, and those residents that do not
like the resulting choice (which is established by democratic
elections) should be free to move to other countries whose choices
they like better.... [L]et people who do not like the result [of
quadrennial elections in which proper tax rates are debated and
decided] move overseas, and stop taxing them there even if they
retain U.S. citizenship.' 3 1
I have previously addressed, and critiqued, this argument, concluding
that the Tiebout sorting model cannot be usefully applied to the CBT versus
RBT debate. 132 First, a number of Tiebout's assumptions do not exist in
this context, such as the need for local public goods (Tiebout explicitly
128 Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad, supra note 2, at 191-92.

129 See Graetz & Warren, supra note 125, at 1136 ("As for mobile, high-income
workers, including star soccer players among others, there is ample evidence that Europeans
are quite willing to change their residence, specifically in response to lower tax rates.")
(citations omitted); Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad, supra note 2, at
190-91 (citing examples).
130 Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad, supra note 2, at 193-94.
Even countries that are not generally considered tax havens might have regimes that would
attract U.S. citizens if the U.S. switched to an RBT regime. See, e.g., infra note 185

(discussing U.K. non-domiciliary regime that, even if proposed changes are made, could
provide significant tax benefits for 15 years for an individual residing in London).
131 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, And Yet It Moves: A Paradigm in the 21" Century 10-11 (U.

Mich. L. & Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12-008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=2055160; see also Mason, supra note 8, at 225 (citing Tiebout for
proposition that "[f]ree movement also may help reveal people's true preferences for levels
of tax and public goods as people vote with their feet by moving to the jurisdiction that

provides their desired mix of tax and benefits").
132 Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad, supra note 2, at 197-200.
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states that the model does not apply at the federal level), the lack of
spillover benefits or costs between communities (at the international level,
there may be significant spillover benefits to a citizen living abroad from
U.S. expenditures), and the necessity of an individual being a member of
only a single community at any given time (in contrast to a U.S. citizen,
who could reside in another country, yet simultaneously vote and thereby
influence tax and expenditure levels in the United States). 33
As
importantly, Tiebout's model does not address the role of citizenship
allegiance (from either the perspective of the individual or the country), and
does not consider the "psychic or similar cost to either the individual or a
particular community when the individual makes his residence decision
based purely on where his expenditure preference patterns are best
34
satisfied." 1
3.

Immigration Neutrality Concerns

Ruth Mason raises an additional decision margin that might be relevant
in the CBT versus RBT discussion. 135 She notes that CBT may impact a
noncitizen's decision of whether or not to migrate to the United States and
eventually become a U.S. citizen. 136 According to Mason,
[c]itizenship taxation presumably discourages both initial
migration and naturalization by marginal migrants from other
countries ....
In deciding whether and where to move, rational
marginal migrants calculate the tax for the duration of their
anticipated visit. But they also consider the possibility that they
will stay permanently. In the United States, unlike in any of the
countries with which the United States competes for skilled
migrants, the decision to naturalize (or take up permanent legal
residence) comes with a hefty price tag: life-long worldwide
taxation for the migrant and any of her U.S.-citizen children....
For immigrants to the United States who may be contemplating
retiring back home or moving to a third country, the citizenship
tax stands as a barrier to naturalization and probably also to initial
immigration .'37
To some extent, this concern about immigration neutrality would apply

131

id. at 198.
134 Id. at 200. These concerns are addressed in more detail infra Part 0.
135 Mason, supra note 8, at 228-230.
136

Id.

117 Id. at 289-90 (citations omitted).
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even under an RBT regime. During the time that the would-be immigrant
resides in the United States, she would be subject to worldwide taxation
even under an RBT regime. Furthermore, given that the RBT proposals
generally include some kind of exit tax, she would probably be subject to
some type of tax upon surrendering her U.S. residence.138 Accordingly,
once a noncitizen immigrant has resided in the United States long enough to
be subject to an exit tax under the proposed RBT regimes, the current CBT
regime (which has an exit tax upon surrender of citizenship or, in the case
of a noncitizen, cessation of long-term lawful permanent resident status)
might not provide significant additional disincentives to naturalize.
More importantly, Mason suggests that CBT might discourage highly
skilled migrants from coming to the United States in the first place, thereby
potentially depriving the United States of individuals who would be very
valuable to the economy. 39 While it is possible that CBT would have such
an impact, it would occur only' if the would-be immigrant satisfied a
number of conditions: a very long time-horizon (rather than just looking for
the economic opportunity that provides the best chance of short or mediumterm success); an expectation of eventual financial success in the United
States; an anticipation that, upon having financial success, she would want
to become a citizen; an awareness and understanding of the U.S. tax laws;
and, finally, a subjective internal calculation that, were she to naturalize, the
discounted potential costs of future citizenship-based taxation on foreign
source income after someday returning to her home (or a third) country
outweigh the more immediate economic benefits of migrating to the United
States.
While it is possible that, at the margin, some noncitizens might forego
the opportunity to pursue educational or work opportunities in the United
States under this calculation, my (admittedly nonscientific) intuition, 4° is
that, as a practical matter, the number is very limited. If, for a particular
individual, moving to the United States (whether for educational or work
opportunities) provides the best chance of financial success, she is likely to
take that opportunity. To the extent that other factors (including family,
cultural, language, visas, etc.) influence the decision, which they certainly
would, it is likely that the possibility of eventual citizenship-based taxation
(if the individual were fortunate enough to find financial success and
138 See Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad, supra note 2, at 136-

39.
139 Mason, supra note 8, at 228.

Presumably, even an RBT regime with an exit tax

might have a similar effect, particularly if other countries that the potential migrant was
considering did not have such a tax.
140 Cf. Shaviro, supra note 8, at 42 (noting the need to sometimes fall back on
"intuition" in the context of citizenship-based taxation discussions).
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eventually chose to become a citizen) would likely be relatively low on the
list. Thus, from the perspective of the United States, the future ability to
attract these highly skilled immigrants depends much more on non-tax
factors - such as a strong economic environment, economic stability, rule
of law norms, political stability, educational opportunities, availability of
potential venture capital, availability of economic and financial markets;
availability of talent to work with, and networking opportunities - to
ensure that the country remains attractive for highly-skilled would-be
immigrants. As long as the United States remains attractive with respect to
these more fundamental drivers of economic start-up success, the impact of
CBT on immigration decisions is likely to remain slight.
This intuition regarding the relatively limited impact of the CBT
regime seems to be supported by the actual experience of the United States
over the past few decades (and before). While it is not possible to quantify
(or identify in any reliable way) those highly skilled noncitizens, if any,
who would have immigrated to the United States but for concerns about the
CBT regime, it is important to note that significant numbers of highly
skilled noncitizens continue to enter the United States each year, despite the
existence of the CBT regime. For example, the number of applicants for H1B visas (for highly skilled technical workers) continues to far exceed the
availability of such visas,
even though the number of such visas has
increased each year. 142 These circumstances certainly suggest that, for vast
numbers of educated and highly skilled noncitizens, the existence of the
United States' CBT regime (if it is considered at all) is far outweighed by
other factors.
Moreover, approximately "25% of [U.S.] high-tech
companies founded between 1995 and 2005 ...had at least one immigrant
founder,"' 143 strongly suggesting that these desired high-skill immigrants
apparently were not deterred by the existence of the CBT regime. The fact
that one high-profile immigrant high-tech founder - Eduardo Saverin of
141 For example, applications during the first week of the 2015 application process
exceeded the entire annual supply of H-lB visas. See Miriam Jordan, Applicationsfor H-lB
Visas Hit Limit Quickly, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2015, at A2. Although an H-lB visa is not
itself an immigrant visa, it is considered a dual intent visa, so that a holder might in the
future apply for permanent resident status. THE H-lB BENEFITS - MULTIPLE YEAR
DURATION, THE DUAL INTENT, THE ABILITY TO CHANGE EMPLOYERS, AND H-4 WORK PERMIT,

http://www.greencardapply.com/hlb/hlb-benefit.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2016).
142 Between 2010 and 2014, the number of H-1B visas issued increased from 117,409

to 161,369.
YEARS

DEP'T. OF STATE, NONIMMIGRANT VISAS ISSUED BY CLASSIFICATION FISCAL

2010-2014,

tbl.

XVI(B),

http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/

AnnualReports/FY2014AnnualReport/FY14AnnualReport-TablXVIB.pdf.
143 Robert Lenzner, 40% of the Largest U.S. Companies Founded by Immigrants or
Their Children, FORBES, Apr. 25, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertlenzner/2013/04/

25/40-largest-u-s-companies-founded-by-immigrants-or-their-children/.
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Facebook - recently surrendered his citizenship for tax purposes and
received widespread media attention reinforces the fact that the vast number
of such immigrants retain their citizenship' 44
4.

Tradeoffs Among These Margins

In summary, distortions might occur with respect to citizenship
retention (and, to an even smaller extent, with respect to immigration
decisions) under a CBT regime, while distortions might occur with respect
to residence location under an RBT regime (in the absence of CBT). As
discussed above, from a quantitative perspective, the citizenship distortions
under the existing CBT regime have been relatively limited, with only a
few thousand individuals surrendering citizenship in each of the past few
years, despite the heightened scrutiny on overseas citizens and their
reporting obligations. In contrast, given the experience of foreign countries
as well as U.S. states that rely on RBT, my intuition is that the number of
citizens who would establish foreign residence under an RBT regime would
be significantly greater (particularly when those who do so for transfer,
145
Even Ruth Mason,
rather than just income, tax purposes is considered).
that
"[c]itizenship is
acknowledged
who generally supports RBT, has
relatively inelastic. That is, taxpayers are less likely to give up their
citizenship than their residence in order to save tax, so taxing them based on
their citizenship will create fewer distortions than taxing them based on
where they reside.",146 While the absolute number of individuals who
would establish foreign residence under an RBT might not be large relative
to the entire population, given that many non-tax factors would influence
the decision, the amount of lost revenue might be significant, given that
those induced to change residence might be very high-income (or, in the
case of transfer tax savings, very high net worth) individuals.

144 Moreover, even Saverin's citizenship surrender occurred many years after he no
longer was actively involved with Facebook, and thus had stopped contributing his skills to
that company. See Brian Solomon, Eduardo Saverin Renounces U.S. Citizenship Ahead of
Mega Facebook IPO, FORBES, May 11, 2012, https://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/

2012/05/11 /eduardo-saverin-renounces-u-s-citizenship-ahead-of-mega-facebookipo/#252d538e lff6.
145 See Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad, supra note 2, at 200-

05 (discussing the potential U.S. transfer tax savings under an RBT regime, which might be
achieved through lifetime gifts, thereby negating the need to continue residing abroad until
death). The greater likelihood of changing residence under an RBT regime than citizenship
under a CBT regime is reinforced by the fact that residence can be changed while retaining

citizenship, but in order to surrender citizenship an individual must generally also change
residence (at least if she currently is living in the United States).
146 Mason, supra note 8, at 227.
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In addition to the greater quantitative impact of residence distortions
under a RBT regime (compared to citizenship distortions under a CBT
regime), a shift to RBT taxation of citizens might create significant
qualitative concerns, particularly with respect to its effect on social
cohesion. This concern is discussed in Part II.D. infra.
C. Administrability

Several scholars suggest that administrative concerns are the most
significant problem

with citizenship-based

taxation.

4

7

I,

too, have

previously noted that significant administrative concerns that can arise with
CBT (as well as with RBT). 48 These concerns can arise in a number of
contexts, as follows.
1.

Determining Who is a Relevant Taxpayer
The question of how to define the relevant taxpayer in the cross-border

setting -

e.g., based on citizenship or based on residence -

raises

important compliance and enforcement issues. For most individuals, using
citizenship as the touchstone establishes a bright line. 49 Presumably, most
individuals living abroad know whether or not they are U.S. citizens.
Accordingly, under a citizenship-based test, most individuals with foreign
ties will easily be able to determine whether or not they are a U.S. taxpayer.
Of course, this assumes that individuals living abroad are aware of the
citizenship-based tax rules. As demonstrated by the recent FATCA and
FBAR compliance initiatives, many citizens abroad (who know of their
citizenship status) may not have known of the general treatment of citizens
as taxpayers (and the related filing requirements).150
This lack of
knowledge, however, has likely decreased significantly over the past
147 See, e.g., Blum & Singer, supra note 34, at 716; see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 38,
at 394 ("[A]dministrability is perhaps the strongest argument for not taxing nonresident

citizens.").
148 See generally Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad, supra note 2.
149 See Zelinsky, supra note 11, at 1323-24. Even if the United States retains its
citizenship-based test for citizens, a residence-based test will continue to apply to
noncitizens, necessitating the continued application of that test by the Service. See Mason,
supra note 8, at 212-13. This article, however, focuses on proposals to change the treatment

of citizens. Accordingly, any references in the text to the administrative benefits of a
citizenship test (or administrative problems with a residence test) are confined to the benefits

(or problems) associated with the tax treatment of citizens.
150

Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad, supra note 2, at 171

("[Elven FATCA's critics acknowledge that one side effect is that many more citizens
abroad have become aware of their U.S. tax and reporting obligations.").
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several years, given the broad publicity that FATCA has received among
the overseas citizen community.' 5 '
The bright-line benefits of a citizenship would be less compelling with
one subgroup of overseas citizens - the "unaware" or "unknowing"
52
citizens who might not have knowledge of their U.S. citizenship status.1
Given that this subgroup is relatively small compared to the total
citizenship population (and, by definition, would not generally incur
voluntary compliance costs associated with the self-assessment system),
there does not appear to be a compelling reason to base the general taxpayer
test on them. Rather, to the extent citizenship status may subsequently be
discovered (either by the taxpayer or the Service), special rules could be
adopted to address their circumstances and provide appropriate relief. As
discussed above, 53 such rules would need to include factors for
determining whether the individual was actually an "unknowing" citizen,
thereby adding some additional complexity for this subgroup.
In contrast to a citizenship-based test which, for most individuals,
would provide a bright-line determination, a residence-based test introduces
significant complexities to the threshold determination of taxpayer status.
These complexities in determining an individual's tax residence are
problematic not only for purposes of ongoing compliance, but also because
a change in residence can trigger significant immediate tax liability under
the proposed RBT exit taxes.
As discussed above, 54 RBT proposals contain a broad range of
possible tests for determining whether a citizen should be treated as a tax
resident, including the use of the existing "substantial presence" test
applicable to noncitizens (which applies a three-year weighted day count,
while excluding certain days and excepting some individuals with a
subjective "closer connection" to another country); the adoption of a
subjective "bona fide" residence test; or the implantation of a multi-factor
test, which might use citizenship as creating a rebuttable presumption (and
look to a "white list" of countries where a citizen could reside without
being subject to U.S. worldwide taxation), or look to the country where the
individual has closer personal and economic connections.
Regardless of which of these residence tests is adopted, more
complexity will be added to the threshold determination of whether a U.S.
151

Id.

152 See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.

The other special subgroups of

citizens discussed above (i.e., "accidental" or "nominal" citizens), while raising potential
ability-to-pay concerns, do not raise these administrative concerns, as members of these
subgroups generally know that they are citizens.
153 See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
154 See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
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citizen is considered a U.S. taxpayer. For example, a number of these
proposals rely on a subjective inquiry, such as the individual's "bona fide
residence" or place of closer connections. Prior to 1984, the United States
applied a subjective "bona fide residence" test to noncitizens for purposes
of determining their residence status. This subjective test, however, was
abandoned because it "did not provide adequate guidance with respect to
residence status" and "a more objective definition of residence" was
needed.
Reintroducing this test, or similar tests that rely on subjective
inquiries for the threshold jurisdictional determination, is likely to raise
many of those same problems.
2.

Compliance and Enforcement

Once the threshold question of "who" should be taxed is resolved,
significant issues can arise regarding that person's compliance and the
Service's enforcement efforts. These concerns have plagued CBT since its
adoption. After all, "[t]o the extent the tax on citizens living abroad cannot
be enforced, the equity and efficiency concerns discussed above may be
moot."' 156 More than a century ago Professor Edwin Seligman, who played
an important role in the adoption of the modern income tax, observed that it
might be "virtually impossible" to reach the foreign income of nonresident
citizens.! 57 Even to the extent that modern developments might allow for a
more enforceable CBT regime, Dan Shaviro notes that the resulting
compliance costs, if substantial, create deadweight losses that are
objectionable (particularly given the underlying rationale for CBT that
158
considers an overseas citizen to be one of "us").
I previously addressed in detail many of the enforcement concerns that
arise under CBT and, while acknowledging their continued existence,
suggested that recent developments may "strengthen the potential for

155 STAFF OF JOINT COMM.

ON TAX., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE

PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, at 463-64 (Comm. Print 1984). A
"bona fide resident" test exists under current law as one of the two possible ways to qualify
for the foreign earned income exclusion. I.R.C. § 911 (d)(1)(A). However, due to "its
vagueness[,] overseas citizens instead try to meet the 330-day alternative test, if possible, to
qualify for the foreign earned income exclusion." Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of
Citizens Abroad, supra note 2, at 175.
156 Kirsch, Taxing Citizens, supra note 2, at 496.
157 EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY, THEORY OF

INCOME TAXATION AT HOME AND ABROAD 517 (1914); see also Kirsch, Taxing Citizens,
supra note 2, at 496 (acknowledging that "concerns about enforcement might provide the
strongest argument against taxing the foreign source income of citizens residing abroad").
158 Shaviro, supra note 8, at 26.
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enforcing U.S. tax laws against overseas U.S. citizens.' ' 159 These
developments include heightened enforcement initiatives, such as the
prosecution of Swiss banks and bankers for conspiring to defraud the
6
United States, thereby undermining tax-motivated bank secrecy;' 0
heightened enforcement of FBAR reporting requirements regarding foreign
bank and financial accounts;' 6 1 and, perhaps most importantly, the
Congressional enactment and Service implementation of the FATCA
regime, which indirectly enlists foreign financial institutions into reporting
on foreign financial accounts held by U.S. persons (including U.S. citizens
living overseas). 162 In conjunction with these increased enforcement
efforts, the Service has implemented several rounds of offshore voluntary
disclosure programs in order to bring non-compliant individuals into the
6 Moreover, these U.S. developments have had a significant effect
system .163
on global information sharing and cooperation norms, "strengthen [ing] the
willingness of other countries to expand information sharing to combat
cross-border tax evasion. ' 6 4 While cross-border enforcement of the U.S.
tax laws (particularly in the context of CBT) remains a significant concern,
the prospects for its viability are significantly greater than they were at the
time that Seligman made his pessimistic observation.
With respect to taxpayer compliance burdens, some recent
developments have made things easier. For example, prior to the spread of
the Internet, some overseas citizens faced significant hurdles obtaining even
basic information about U.S. tax rules and access to required forms. The
availability of forms and information on the Internet has addressed these
basic concerns, at least for those overseas citizens with access to the
Internet (although, as I have previously pointed out, the Service should do a
better job of organizing and disseminating this information in a consistent
165
and usable manner).
At the same time, other recent developments have imposed additional
compliance costs, which have sometimes been significant, on overseas
taxpayers. As I previously observed,
[t]he recent expansion in overseas enforcement was not driven by
concerns over citizens residing abroad. Rather, its focus is
principally individuals living in the United States who are hiding
159 Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatmentof Citizens Abroad, supra note 2, at 141.
60

Id. at 141-46.

161

Id. at 146-48.

162
163

Id. at 148-53.
Id. at 153-57.

164

Id. at 158.

165 Id. at 214.
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income in foreign accounts. Nonetheless, in a citizenship-based
taxing system, enforcement actions targeting foreign accounts will,
by their very nature, disproportionately impact citizens living
abroad. Whereas it might be relatively unusual for a citizen living
in the United States to have signatory authority over a foreign
bank account, such authority is relatively routine for a citizen
residing abroad. 166
As a result, a citizen residing abroad and conducting routine local
banking activity will be pulled into the FBAR reporting regime . 167
Similarly, she could be pulled into the PFIC regime merely by investing in
a local mutual fund (which presumably would be organized in a foreign
country), and might be pulled into the Controlled Foreign Corporation
regime if she organizes a corporation in her residence country for routine
business operations. Each of these regimes not only raises the possibility of
additional U.S. tax liability but, perhaps as importantly, also the specter of
significant professional fees to ensure proper reporting compliance and the
avoidance of potentially significant penalties.' 68 Particularly given the
communal ties-based rational for treating overseas citizens as members of
the U.S. community for ability-to-pay purposes, these additional and
potentially unnecessary additional costs imposed on overseas citizens
should be of concern. As Dan Shaviro noted, "insofar as we deem citizens
living abroad still to be at least partially among 'us' normatively, a bad ratio
of [compliance cost-driven] deadweight loss to revenue raised is directly
objectionable." 169
While these compliance cost concerns are real, many of them are not
an inherent feature of a CBT regime. Rather, as I have previously
observed, many of them are the result of Congress and the Service, in their
efforts to address abuses by U.S.-resident citizens holding foreign accounts,
failing to carefully consider the unique circumstances faced by citizens
abroad. For example, the FBAR, PFIC, and CFC rules, and their associated
reporting and penalty provisions, generally fail to acknowledge that the
types of foreign accounts and entities utilized by U.S.-resident citizens for
potential tax avoidance or evasion (as well as legitimate) purposes, might
be a part of routine business and investment activity for a citizen living in a
166
167

Id. at 161.
Id. at 161-65.

168 In addition, there have been reports that some foreign financial institutions have

turned away U.S.-citizen clients due to concerns about FATCA reporting obligations. Id. at
166. However, as discussed elsewhere, this concern might be expected to decrease once

FATCA has been fully implemented. Id. at 167-68.
169 Shaviro, supra note 8, at 26.
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foreign country. 170 The Service has recently begun to take some steps to
address the unique circumstances faced by overseas citizens under these
regimes but, as I and others have argued elsewhere,'17' both Congress and
the Service must do more to simplify the reporting and other compliance
burdens on overseas citizens, particularly those who present relatively low
risk of tax evasion. 72 Others have also suggested steps that Congress could
take to lessen the compliance burdens under the existing CBT regime, such
foreign earned income exclusion an
as Dan Shaviro's proposal to make the173
"opt-out," rather an "opt-in" provision.
While the elimination of CBT would eliminate some of the more
problematic compliance burdens, it would not eliminate all compliance and
enforcement costs in a cross-border context. Even under an RBT regime,
the Service would still need to enforce the tax laws with respect to U.S.
residents with overseas accounts. Indeed, as mentioned above, FATCA
was enacted primarily to address concerns about compliance by U.S.resident citizens holding offshore financial assets. As long as the United
States continues to tax the worldwide income (particularly financial
income) of its residents (which all of the RBT-based proposals assume),
some significant enforcement and compliance issues will remain (although
admittedly to a more limited extent than under CBT).
3.

Exit Taxes

The mark-to-market "exit taxes" of both the current CBT regime and
the proposed RBT regimes create additional enforcement and compliance
costs. As discussed above, under the current CBT regime, a U.S. citizen
who surrenders her citizenship, and whose average income or net worth
exceeds statutory thresholds, 17 4 is treated as if she sold her assets and must
170

Of course, not all uses of foreign accounts and entities by overseas citizens are

benign for tax purposes, so some compliance-related concerns about them are warranted.
171 See, e.g., NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 262-80

(2012), http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2012-Annual-Report/downloads/Volume-i

.pdf

(listing "Challenges Persist for International Taxpayers as the IRS Moves Slowly to Address

Their Needs" as one of the "Most Serious Problems" facing the Service, and including a list
of recommendations).
172 Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad. supra note 2, at 212-13

(describing elimination of FBAR-related penalties for certain low-risk citizens abroad, and
increase in FATCA-related reporting thresholds for individuals residing abroad); see also id.
at 213-14 (describing efforts of the National Taxpayer Advocate in this area).
173 See Shaviro, supra note 8, at 17.
174 In 2017, an individual generally is subject to this provision if her five-year average

annual net income tax liability is $162,000, or her net worth is at least $2 million. See I.R.C.
§ 877A; Rev. Proc. 2016-55, 2016-45 I.R.B. 707, § 3.32. The provision also applies if the
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recognize any gain in excess of $699,000.175 This regime raises significant
enforcement issues when a citizen surrenders citizenship. For example, the
United States may have significant difficulties determining the extent of an
individual's assets, particularly those held abroad, 17 6 and may have
difficulty collecting the tax from an uncooperative taxpayer.
However, similar enforcement difficulties may arise if the United
States adopts an RBT regime for citizens, given that the RBT proposals
generally contemplate an exit tax when a citizen ceases to be a U.S. tax
resident.1 77 Indeed, an exit tax under an RBT regime might create greater
aggregate enforcement and compliance burdens than the current CBT exit
tax, "given that (unlike citizenship status, which is the triggering
consideration under current law and which typically can be lost only once)
residency status might change frequently, resulting in potentially repeated
application of the exit tax to certain citizens." 178 Moreover, to the extent
that the test for tax residence under an RBT regime is based on subjective
factors ,7 9 the triggering event itself for the exit tax might cause compliance

and enforcement uncertainty.
D. Social Cohesion - An UnderappreciatedFactor

A significant, and often under-appreciated, concern raised by the
abandonment of CBT (and replacement by some form of RBT for citizens)
is its impact on social cohesion within the United States. As I have
observed elsewhere,
the creation of a system where significant numbers of U.S. citizens
(or even somewhat smaller numbers of athletes, entertainers, or
other high-profile citizens) can voluntarily excuse themselves
[from U.S. taxation] could further undermine the cohesion of
American society, creating the perception that some citizens are
exempt from a fundamental obligation of citizenship-the
80
payment of taxes-while others are not.'

individual fails to certify under penalties of perjury that she has complied with her income

tax obligations for the past five years. I.R.C. § 877(a)(2)(C).
175 See I.R.C. 877A(a); Rev. Proc. 2016-55, 2016-45 I.R.B. 707, § 3.33 (noting the

2017 inflation-adjusted exclusion amount).
176 See generally William L. Dentino & Christine Manolakas, The Exit Tax: A Move in
the Right Direction, 3 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REV. 341, 416-17 (2012).
177 See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
178 Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad, supra note 2, at 137.
179 See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
180 Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad, supra note 2, at 196.
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This concern is exacerbated because, the elimination of CBT would
create significant incentives for high-income U.S. citizens, particularly
8
'
those whose professional or personal lives allowed geographic flexibility,'
to establish residence abroad. This income-tax driven incentive would be
exacerbated if citizenship-based taxation were also eliminated with respect
to the federal gift and estate tax. Indeed, as a practical matter, the transfer
tax incentives for establishing foreign residence (in the82 absence of CBT)
might significantly outweigh the income tax incentives.
Concerns about tax-driven changes in residence in the absence of CBT
are not merely conjecture. Other countries that rely on RBT often
experience significant numbers of their high-income citizens establishing
residence in a foreign country for tax purposes. 83 For example, media
reports cite examples of high-income entertainers, businessmen, and
athletes from the United Kingdom, France, and Germany establishing tax
residence in tax havens such as Monaco, Andorra, Liechtenstein and the
Channel Islands in order to avoid their home countries' residence-based
taxation regimes (while still maintaining the nationality of their home
country). 84 Moreover, recent reports suggest that tens of thousands of highincome (but lower profile) French and German nationals have established
foreign tax residence for these reasons. 85 A number of tax havens exist,

181

Id. at

189-90 (discussing the personal and professional factors that might influence

a decision to establish foreign residence in the absence of CBT).
182 Id. at 200-05 (discussing the often underappreciated role of the estate tax in the
citizenship-based taxation discussion).
113 See id. at 190-91; see also id. at 191-94 (discussing the somewhat, although not
identically, analogous situation of high-income and high-wealth individuals changing U.S.
state residence for tax purposes).

114Id. at 190-91 (discussing the Rolling Stones, Pink Floyd, David Bowie, and Richard
Branson).
185 Id. at 190 n.331. The sensitivity of high-income and high-wealth individuals to
residence-based taxation has been highlighted more recently during debate over the United
Kingdom's proposal to tighten its non-domiciliary tax regime. Under this regime, in
exchange for a relatively nominal annual fee, individuals residing in the United Kingdom are
not taxed on the foreign income that they do not remit to the U.K. George Osborne, the
U.K. Chancellor of the Exchequer, recently proposed that this non-domiciliary regime be
eliminated for long-term residents (i.e., those who have lived in the U.K. for more than
fifteen of the past twenty years), and also for those who were born in the U.K. to British
parents. See Juliette Garside, Permanent Non-Dom Tax Status to be Abolished, Chancellor
Announces, GUARDIAN, July 8, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jul/08/nonIn response to this
dom-tax-status-abolished-individuals-born-uk-budget-george-osborne.
proposal, tax professionals warned that there could be an "exodus of the foreign billionaires
whose names now dominate the lists of Britain's wealthiest residents." Id. According to

one accountant, "these [billionaires] will probably cease to be UK citizens once they pass 15
years. It's unlikely they are going to volunteer to pay UK tax on their global income. They
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such as Monaco, Andorra, Liechtenstein and the Channel Islands, that cater
to high-income nationals of other countries and that might welcome high186
income U.S. citizens if the United States repeals its CBT regime.
Moreover, a number of countries that are not generally viewed as low-tax
countries might have favorable regimes that would attract high income U.S.
citizens. For example, the United Kingdom's non-domiciliary regime could
allow U.K.-resident U.S. citizens to avoid tax on the bulk of their non-U.K.
income. 87 Even proposed changes that would place a fifteen-year limit on
an individual's use of the U.K. regime would still provide a significant
amount of time for individuals to enjoy tax advantages - for example, a
wealthy U.S. citizen (in the absence of CBT) could establish nondomiciliary residence in the U.K. long enough to not only enjoy some
income tax advantages, but also, perhaps more importantly, to make
substantial gifts that would escape the U.S. transfer tax regime.1 88 Of
course, it is not unreasonable to assume that other countries might attempt
to create favorable tax regimes for U.S. citizens once such individuals are
"in play" if CBT is repealed.
To the extent that the repeal of CBT results in significant numbers of
U.S. citizens living abroad and not paying U.S. (or potentially any) income
or transfer tax, regardless of whether those individual live abroad for nontax reasons or were induced to move abroad for tax reasons, there could be
significant impacts on U.S. society. First, "if a significant number of highincome individuals did so (or even a smaller number of extremely high' 89
income individuals did so), there could be some direct revenue impact."'
More importantly, such circumstances could have a troublesome impact on
social cohesion in the United States. It is likely that there would be
may retain UK homes and send their children to school here but they themselves will have to
spend a reduced numbers of days in the UK."

Id. This example, however, is not directly

analogous to the U.S. situation, as the high-wealth individuals expected to abandon U.K.
residence under the proposal are primarily non-U.K. nationals and, therefore, might not have
as strong a connection to the country as U.S. citizens have to the United States.
186 See Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad, supra note 2, at 190
n.331.
187 See Garside, supra note 185.
188 See generally Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatmentof Citizens Abroad, supra note 2,
at 200-05 (discussing significant opportunities to escape U.S. estate and gift taxes in the
absence of CBT). The U.S. estate tax could also be avoided for non-U.S. property if the
individual dies while residing abroad. However, given the availability of lifetime gifts, it is

possible that the individual could make U.S.-tax-free gifts during the relatively brief period
residing abroad and then return to the United States, particularly if the United States repeals
I.R.C. § 2801, as some opponents of CBT have suggested. Id. at 202-05 (discussing the
limited impact that proposed anti-abuse provisions would have in preventing this problem).
189 id. at 195.
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widespread news reports of wealthy U.S. citizens residing abroad and
escaping U.S. taxation, just as there has been widespread coverage of U.S.
domestic corporations engaging in inversion transactions to escape U.S.
taxation.19° As I previously observed, this publicity might lead those
citizens living in the United States to "conclude that citizens abroad are
'getting away with something,' ' ' 1 which might lead not only to a loss of
confidence in the tax system (and the social norm of tax compliance), but
more importantly might lead U.S. citizens to lose confidence in the U.S.
social and political system. After all, it would create the appearance of two
classes of citizenship - one for the extremely wealthy who could remain
U.S. citizens and yet not pay their perceived "fair share" to support the
country, and one for everyone else who continued to financially support the
country. Such a result is often alluded to in those countries that rely on
RBT and, consequently, have periodic news reports of high-income
individuals establishing foreign tax residence to avoid paying taxes. It
should be noted that such a reaction would also reinforce the ability-to-pay
justification discussed above, by demonstrating that, at least from the
perspective of citizens remaining in the United States, citizens living abroad
remain part of the larger community that is expected to support the country
financially.
It could be argued that, if social cohesion concerns were a significant
concern, they already would have arisen under the current CBT regime,
given that the foreign earned income exclusion and foreign tax credit allow
many U.S. citizens living abroad to pay no (or reduced) U.S. income taxes.
However, two distinguishing considerations may explain why there are only
limited social cohesion concerns with the existing regime. First (and of
lesser importance), the extent to which a particular person may not be
paying (or is paying a reduced amount of) U.S. taxes due to the foreign
earned income exclusion or foreign tax credit may not be evident to the
public. After all, individual tax returns are not disclosed, so the public (and
media) have no way of knowing the extent to which a particular individual
invoked these provisions.' 92 In contrast, as illustrated by the European
examples discussed above, under an RBT regime the media is likely to
learn of high-income (or high-wealth) U.S. citizens who move abroad, and
is likely to infer, merely based on the foreign residence, that they will no
longer be paying U.S. taxes.
Second (and more importantly), even to the extent the public currently
190

Id. As with the inversion phenomenon, such news reports are likely to lead to calls

for congressional hearings on the matter. Id. at 195-96.
191 Kirsch, Taxing Citizens, supra note 2, at 502.
192 By itself, of course, an argument that "the public wouldn't know about it" is not a
strong justification for an otherwise objectionable tax policy.
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is aware of individuals utilizing the foreign tax credit and foreign earned
income exclusion, they might not have strong visceral objections. My
intuition is that most resident-citizens understand (or could be made to
understand if it became part of a larger debate) that a U.S. citizen living
abroad will face tax obligations in more than one country. Thus, the public
might understand, at least on a general level, that the foreign tax credit
serves as a rough-justice way to split taxing jurisdiction. While the U.S.
public might not understand (or care) about the details of that splitting e.g., the foreign tax credit limitations - their understanding would
probably be sufficient to prevent any reduced U.S. taxation from
implicating social cohesion concerns. While the foreign earned income
exclusion might not be justified under the same double-taxation-related
arguments (especially if the citizen resides in a no- or low-tax country), it
too would probably not raise significant social cohesion concerns even if
the domestic public were aware of it. In particular, the amounts involved
are capped, and thus would not raise the specter of abusive individuals
moving abroad merely to obtain (relatively) limited U.S. tax savings. In
contrast, under an RBT regime, citizens with millions of dollars of income
(and millions or billions of dollars of wealth) moving abroad (particularly
to a location identified in the press as a potential tax haven) are much more
likely to raise public concerns about abuse.
E. Is There Something Exceptional about American Exceptionalism

Some critics of CBT suggest that the United States' outlier status may
be an independent justification to move to an RBT regime.' 93 For example,
Bernard Schneider asks "[w]hat is the justification for U.S. exceptionalism
on this point? Why should political allegiance to the United States be any
more demanding and costly than to any other country?' ' 194 Similarly,
Reuven Avi-Yonah observes that "[i]f the other democracies do not impose
worldwide taxation on their nonresident citizens because of the benefits
they provide, it is unclear why we should exact such a high price for our
' 95
benefits."'
Several considerations suggest that concerns about American
exceptionalism in this context do not, of themselves, justify the
abandonment of CBT. As noted above, despite the formal difference
between the United States and other countries, the substantive gap between

193 See Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad, supra note 2, at 206-

10.
194 Schneider, supra note 42, at 46.
195 Avi-Yonah, supra note 38, at 392.
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the United States and other countries regarding the treatment of citizens'
foreign income may be narrowing. 96 In addition, as I have previously
observed, "[c]ountries implement tax policies based on a broad range of
considerations, including cultural, political, historical, institutional, and
economic factors."'' 9 7 These considerations might explain and justify a
country adopting a tax provision that differs from other countries.
Accordingly, "the United States' (partial) outlier status is relevant only
to the extent it creates problems whose costs (in connection with other
potential problems raised by citizenship-based taxation) outweigh the
benefits."' 98 In other words, exceptionalism is a relevant factor not of itself,
but only to the extent it creates potential problems. For example, it might
undermine harmonization among countries' tax regimes. However, "this
area would hardly be the only area in which countries take different
approaches."' 99 Even other countries that have RBT regimes "do not use a
uniform definition of tax residence, thereby creating the possibility that20an0
individual could be treated as a tax resident of two or more countries."
201
Having rejected this and similar concerns elsewhere , ° there do not appear
to be significant problems uniquely generated by the United States' formal
reliance on citizenship that justify treating its outlier status as an
independent normative consideration. Moreover, while other countries may
sometimes express concern with the United States' use of CBT, the regime
does not appear to be so far outside the international norms that it creates
significant practical problems for relations with the United States.2 °2
Ruth Mason generally agrees that the "uniqueness of U.S. citizenship
taxation []is not enough to condemn it. Jurisdictional conflicts may be an
acceptable cost of arriving at the right tax policy" (although she concludes
that CBT is bad policy). 20 3 She then raises an interesting question at the
opposite end of the spectrum - what if, instead of the United States
remaining an outlier, a significant number of countries adopted CBT.2 °4

196 See supra notes I 1-12 and accompanying text; see also Shaviro, supra note 8, at 17
("[T]he United States could reasonably be viewed as not in substance a dramatic outlier.").
197 Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad, supra note 2, at 206.
'98 Id.at 207.
199 Id.
200 id.
20!

See id. at 206-10.

202 Indeed, most United States income tax treaties include a saving clause that generally
allows the United States to exercise its citizenship-based taxing rights notwithstanding the
treaty. I.R.S., Tax Treaties Can Affect Your Income Tax, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/taxtreaties-can-affect-your-income-tax (last visited Nov. 14, 2016).
203 Mason, supra note 8, at 238.
204 See id. at 238-39.
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She suggests that it might lead to absurd and unworkable results. 20 5 My
inclination is that the results would not be as dire as she suggests. First, a
significant number of countries might not be willing to adopt CBT. As
noted above, countries base their tax policies on a broad range of
considerations, and these non-tax policy considerations might weigh against
CBT. For many countries - particularly countries that, unlike the United
States, have a long history of citizens emigrating - cultural norms might
view a citizen as having an important right to move abroad and not remain
fettered by continuing obligations to that "home" country.
More importantly, unlike the demand for retaining U.S. citizenship,
which Ruth Mason acknowledges is "relatively inelastic, 20 6 the demand for
some other countries' citizenship may be relatively elastic. For at least
some countries, if a citizenship-based tax was imposed on nonresident
citizens, some of those citizens might choose to surrender citizenship rather
than pay the tax. Of course, such a decision would depend on other non-tax
factors, including whether or not the individual had citizenship in another
country (a necessary condition before surrendering home country
citizenship), whether the individual intends to eventually return to the home
country, and the existence of any other consequences for abandoning
citizenship.
In addition, a foreign country might not enact CBT because of the
significant enforcement problems it raises. 207 Indeed, the Philippines
previously abandoned CBT largely because of enforcement difficulties. 208
Even the United States, which might have as broad an enforcement reach as
any country, has difficulties in this regard. While the United States might
be able to improve enforcement with efforts such as FATCA, many other
countries would not be in a position to attempt a similar approach.
Accordingly, it is unlikely that CBT will gain widespread adoption.
Nonetheless, it is certainly possible that a number of countries could adopt
it.
This expansion would, admittedly, create some administrative
complications, as it would increase the number of jurisdictions claiming the
right to impose worldwide taxation. Of course, this would only be
205 See id.

206 Id.at 227.

207For a general discussion of the enforcement problems that arise in an international
context with respect to both individual and corporate taxpayers, see David R. Tillinghast,
Issues of International Tax Enforcement, in THE CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION 38, 38-60
(Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2004).
208 See Kirsch, Taxing Citizens, supra note 2, at 496 (citing Richard D. Pomp, The
Experience of the Philippines in Taxing Its Nonresident Citizens, in INCOME TAXATION AND
INTERNATIONAL MOBILITY 5, 43, 45 (Jagdish N. Bhagwati & John Douglas Wilson eds.,

1989)).
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expanding a problem that already exists to some extent, given that countries
have different, and sometimes overlapping, definitions of resident. We
currently deal with this problem in the context of multiple residents through
tax treaties, which contain tie-breaker provisions to assign residence to a
single country. If the number of countries ultimately adopting CBT were
relatively modest (as I expect it would be), the problem of overlapping
citizenship and residence jurisdiction could be dealt with similarly by
treaty. Admittedly, it is possible (although I think unlikely) that a sufficient
number of countries could adopt CBT to make the treaty resolution
unworkable. If that were the case, I suppose it would create a significant
argument against CBT. However, as things currently exist (and I expect are
likely to remain) this argument seems to be outweighed by the other
justifications in favor of CBT.
IV.

BALANCING THE COMPETING VALUES

The preceding Part illustrates that the CBT versus RBT debate raises a
number of sometimes-competing normative values. As with most tax
policy debates, there is no meta-principle that automatically elevates one of
these competing values above the others, thereby dictating a single correct
answer. 209 Instead, the "best" approach depends on the extent to which
each value is implicated (in either a positive or negative way), and one's
views of the relative importance of each value in this context. For the
following reasons, I believe that, on the whole, the normative case for
taxing the foreign source income (and foreign situs transfers) of citizens
using CBT principles outweighs the normative case for taxing that income
(and those transfers) using RBT principles. This Part first summarizes the
key normative strengths and weaknesses of each approach (discussed in
greater detail in Part II), and then considers the relative importance of these
factors.
Given that citizenship creates a strong communal tie to the United
States, even for most citizens living abroad, ability-to-pay principles
support the use of CBT (even though the current CBT system does not
implement a pure form of these principles). These communal ties are
implicitly acknowledged even by RBT proponents, to the extent they would
impose greater potential tax burdens on nonresident citizens than on
nonresident noncitizens. Admittedly, ability-to-pay arguments grounded in
communal ties have less traction in the case of certain groups of overseas
citizens (in particular, unknowing or unaware citizens, and, to a lesser
209 Cf. Steven J. Burton, Normative Legal Theories: The Case for Pluralism and
Balancing, 98 IOWA L. REV. 550-51 (2013) (discussing the absence of a conclusive meta-

principle in the context of the debate between legal pluralism and monism).
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extent, accidental or nominal citizens). However, as discussed above,
rather than using the concerns faced by these groups as justification to
eliminate all CBT, the concerns raised for these groups could be addressed
with objective and enforceable exceptions, targeted to their particular
circumstances.
Competing efficiency-based arguments focus on different margins.
CBT raises concerns regarding both citizenship neutrality and immigration
neutrality, while RBT raises concerns regarding residence neutrality. As
discussed above, the experience of the last decade suggests that citizenship
neutrality concerns, while real, are relatively limited in magnitude. Even
with the recent spike in citizenship renunciations, the absolute numbers
(just under 3,500 in 2014, and a similar rate through the first half of 2015)
210 are relatively small compared to the total number of U.S. citizens.
Moreover, these numbers might be expected to taper off once those citizens
with the most tenuous subjective connections to the United States have
done so in reaction to the implementation of the FATCA regime, and may
also decrease if the Service takes additional steps to ease the compliance
burdens experienced by overseas citizens. 2 11 As for the immigration
neutrality concerns associated with CBT, for the reasons discussed above I
believe that they are of only limited practical concern.2 12 In particular, the
many non-tax related factors that influence a potential highly skilled
immigrant's decision to enter the United States (and subsequently
naturalize) seem to outweigh (both in theory and practice) the ex ante
concerns, if any, the individual may have about the future U.S. taxation of
foreign source income if the individual were eventually to return to her
home country.
In contrast, the impact of RBT on residence neutrality may be
significant. The experience of foreign countries and U.S. states that rely on
RBT suggests that high income individuals (and, perhaps more importantly,
high wealth individuals who are concerned about transfer taxes) may be
willing to relocate if the potential tax savings are high enough. The
magnitude of residence changes under RBT is likely to be greater than the
magnitude of citizenship losses under CBT, given that an individual can
establish residence outside the United States without surrendering
citizenship, while an individual can only surrender citizenship if she has a
residence outside the United States. 3

210 See supra notes 114-115 and accompanying text.
211

See supra notes 116-117 and accompanying text.

212

See supra notes 140-144 and accompanying text.

213 This observation may not be as strong during the current spike in citizenship
renunciations to the extent that a number of the recent citizenship losses may have involved
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As (or perhaps more) important than the magnitude of tax-driven
residence changes under an RBT regime, such changes might cause
significant social cohesion-related concerns if they result in a permanent
class of wealthy U.S. citizens living abroad and openly not paying taxes
(yet entering the United States periodically, potentially for relatively long
stretches of time under some proposed residence tests). As discussed
above, such concerns might not only implicate tax compliance (e.g.,
undermine voluntary compliance by domestic citizens who perceive that
overseas citizens are "getting away with something"), but more importantly
might generate broader domestic social problems by reinforcing concerns
that wealthy citizens receive more favorable treatment than the rest of
society.214
Administrative concerns exist with respect to both CBT and RBT.
Regarding the threshold question of who is taxed, a CBT regime creates a
relatively bright line, given that most (although not all) citizens abroad are
aware of their citizenship status, whereas RBT proposals may require more
complicated inquiries, particularly if residence tests include subjective
standards in order to prevent potential abuses. With respect to compliance
and enforcement concerns, an RBT regime may impose greater
complexities with respect to the exit tax associated with a change in
residence (given that the definition of resident is less clear than the
definition of citizen, and residence changes are more likely to occur than
citizenship losses). However, once a citizen resides outside the country, an
RBT regime is likely to involve significantly lower enforcement and
compliance costs, given that the nonresident citizen generally will not be
subject to ongoing U.S. tax (other than on U.S. source income). While
recent developments - most notably, the implementation of FATCA and
changes in international information sharing norms - might make
enforcement more viable under a CBT regime, these developments have
imposed significant compliance burdens on overseas citizens. As discussed
above, these compliance costs are likely to be reduced to a reasonably
acceptable level only to the extent the Service (and Congress) make a
greater effort to consider the unique compliance circumstances faced by
overseas citizens, particularly with respect to reporting requirements that
potential concerns about resident citizens
originally were crafted to2address
15
holding foreign accounts.
Ultimately, the case for CBT may depend on the ability of the Service

individuals who already resided abroad and had relatively tenuous connections to the United

States.
214 See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
215 See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
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(and Congress) to craft reasonably acceptable compliance rules for overseas
citizens. As the foregoing summary suggests, the other normative values
- ability-to-pay principles, efficiency concerns, and, perhaps most
importantly, social cohesion principles - tend to favor CBT over RBT.
Despite the weight of these considerations, a compliance regime that does
not consider the unique circumstances of overseas citizens, imposes
substantial compliance costs, and raises the possibility of significant
penalties even for non-intentional reporting failures, undermines the
otherwise-strong case for CBT. Addressing these compliance concerns not
only will reduce the compliance-cost advantage that a RBT regime would
otherwise have over CBT, but would also reduce efficiency concerns to the
extent that at least some citizens at the margin might otherwise decide to
surrender citizenship rather than incur the potentially significant
compliance costs.
While this article has focused on the binary choice of CBT versus RBT
for taxing (or not taxing) the foreign income of nonresident citizens, it is
important to acknowledge that there are other possibilities. For example,
Ayelet Shachar, in an informal discussion at a recent symposium, asked
whether an intermediate approach might be used, under which citizens
residing abroad would continue to be taxed, but their tax rate would be
reduced if they remained abroad for an extended period. 216 For example,
once a citizen resides abroad for ten years, she might have to pay only 50%
of the U.S. tax that would otherwise be owed, and after 20 years she might
have to pay only 25% of the otherwise applicable tax. Perhaps the strongest
justification for such an approach relates to ability-to-pay principles. It
could be argued that the longer a citizen resides abroad, the more tenuous
are her communal ties to the United States. The phasedown in tax liability
might serve as a (somewhat arbitrary) proxy for that diminishing
connection, consistent with Dan Shaviro's observation that "we are inclined
to care somewhat less about our own people when they are abroad for
extended periods...27 To the extent it reduces an individual's tax
liability, this proposal might also be supported by citizenship neutrality
concerns because it decreases the tax cost of retaining citizenship (although,
as discussed above, the number of tax-induced citizenship losses is already
relatively limited, so the number of individuals whose decision ultimately
would have turned on the marginal difference between full taxation and
216 Ayelet Shachar, Remarks at the Tax Citizenship and Income Shifting Symposium
(May 20-21,2015).
217 Shaviro, supra note 8, at 23. It might also serve as a rough proxy for the reduction
in some direct benefits received by a citizen abroad, although many important benefits of

citizenship -

in particular, the right to enter and move to the United States at any time -

would remain in full as long as citizenship was retained.
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50%- or 25%-of-normal taxation may be extremely limited).
Despite these potential arguments for a time-based phasedown of CBT,
such an approach would not be supported by other normative
considerations. For example, the administrative costs of enforcement and
compliance would remain, given that the same general CBT compliance
structure presumably would remain. Indeed, the compliance costs might be
viewed as more problematic under the phasedown approach, given that the
decreased tax revenue would increase the ratio of compliance costs to
revenue raised. 218 The phasedown approach might also raise residence
neutrality concerns (compared to full CBT), as it would create potential
incentives for high-income citizens to move abroad. Such incentives,
however, would not be as great as those raised by RBT, as the phasedown
approach would not yield U.S. tax benefits until the partial taxation
percentages kicked in (e.g., 10 years) and, unlike RBT, the phasedown
approach would not completely eliminate U.S. tax.
Perhaps the most significant concern, yet the most difficult to predict,
relates to a phasedown approach's effect on social cohesion. In particular,
would the domestic community view reduced taxation on (potentially highincome) citizens living abroad as legitimate (e.g., similar to the potential
sympathy for the foreign tax credit discussed above), 21 9 or would they view
it as an illegitimate loophole for the wealthy? Perhaps it might depend on
the extent to which high-profile, high-income individuals were identified as
being eligible for this regime. My (admittedly uncertain) inclination is that
significant social cohesion concerns might arise under this approach
(although not as bad as those under an RBT regime). To the extent most
U.S. citizens probably view citizenship as a binary status (you either are or
you are not a U.S. citizen), they would view citizens living abroad as part of
the citizenship community (obligated to support it) regardless of the amount
of time spent abroad. Accordingly, they would object to a tax regime that
enacted gradations of citizenship. If this inclination is true, a phasedown
approach would raise many of the same social cohesion-related objections
as RBT.
V. CONCLUSION

The various academic articles on citizenship-based taxation over the
past several years have highlighted the numerous, sometimes conflicting
arguments for citizenship-based or residence-based taxation. For the
reasons detailed above - in particular, concerns about residence neutrality

"' Cf. id. at 26 (noting the importance of the ratio of compliance cost deadweight loss
to revenue raised).
219 See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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under RBT and the resulting social cohesion concerns - a strong case
exists for the United States to retain citizenship-based taxation, provided
that the Service and Congress address the significant compliance concerns
faced by citizens abroad.
It should be noted, however, that just as there is no single tax policy
that is necessarily best for all countries at a given time, 22 there is no single
tax policy that is necessarily best for a given country over time. As a
country's cultural, political, historical, institutional, and economic
circumstances change, so too might its tax policies. The conclusions in this
article are based on how the relevant normative considerations currently
apply, and how they might be expected to apply in the foreseeable future.
If, however, these considerations change - for example, there is a
significant change in the elasticity of demand for U.S. citizenship, how
citizens abroad or citizenship more generally is viewed, or how effective
FATCA and other compliance initiatives are - the relative balance might
also change. But until such time, if ever, there does not appear to be a
convincing case to eliminate CBT in favor of RBT for the foreign income
of U.S. citizens.
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See supra note 197 and accompanying text.

